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INTRODUCTION
The cause of global health today is arguably the most influential
human rights movement ever seen, mobilizing vast flows of direct and in-
direct aid to the developing world to fight disease and build health care
infrastructure; prompting the establishment of international organizations
like UNAIDS and the Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Mala-
ria (Global Fund); including global health as a priority in major diplomatic
summits; and driving the formation and implementation of international
agreements to address global health threats. Champions of this movement
claim that the diverse and influential state and non-state actors participat-
ing in the development of the global health regime are evidence of its
normative, law-making power. Speaking of a range of initiatives under-
taken by the World Health Organization (“WHO”), Christopher McDou-
gall, Ross Upshur and Kumanan Wilson wrote that:
Each . . . reflects a revolutionary willingness of the international
community to accept new forms of supranational authority and to
abide by the principle that national sovereignty can in some cir-
cumstances be subordinate to public health protection. As such,
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they are integral parts of the evolution of international health gov-
ernance towards a global public health security regime.1
In 2007, the governments of Brazil, France, Indonesia, Norway, Sene-
gal, South Africa, and Thailand issued the Oslo Ministerial Declaration
declaring that:
The early 21st century . . . has seen an unprecedented convergence
of global health and foreign policy . . . [e]nsuring public health on
a global scale is of bene?t to all countries. Powerful synergies arise
when national interest coincides with the need for concerted re-
gional and global action.2
Indeed, the evidence for the normative strength of the global health
movement is persuasive. From 1995 to 2010, the value of goods and ser-
vices aimed at improving global health increased at least threefold.3
Global health was introduced as a priority at the 26th G8 Summit—giving
rise to the Global Fund—and has remained on the agenda ever since.4
Since 2005, states have updated the International Health Regulations
(“IHR”) to coordinate broader responses to more diseases and have con-
cluded the first international public health treaty, the Framework Conven-
tion for Tobacco Control (“FCTC”).
Yet that evidence is also deceiving. The 2005 IHR, concluded in the
wake of outbreaks of diseases largely in developing countries, appeared to
falter on the unwillingness of wealthy countries to equitably address vac-
cine production and distribution.  Key provisions of the FCTC have failed
in the face of challenges tobacco firms have mounted on the basis of their
rights in trademarks and brands.  Indeed, formal global health instruments
that purportedly capture the health movement’s normative force have
been systematically undermined by a competing global movement: inter-
national intellectual property protection.
Intellectual property rights and public health interventions are in
many ways natural antagonists.  The exclusive control given pharmaceuti-
1. Christopher McDougall et al., Emerging Norms for the Control of Emerging
Epidemics, 86 BULL. OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORG. 643 (2008), available at http://www.who.
int/bulletin/volumes/86/8/08-051771.pdf?ua=1.
2. Celso Amorim et al., Oslo Ministerial Declaration—Global Health: A Pressing For-
eign Policy Issue of Our Time, 369 THE LANCET 1373 (2007), available at http://www.who.int/
trade/events/Oslo_Ministerial_Declaration.pdf.
3. Josh Michaud, Global Health’s Private-Sector Revolution, WORLD POL. REV. (Dec.
14, 2010), http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/7328/global-healths-private-sector-
revolution (citing Inst. for Health Metrics and Evaluation, Financing Global Health 2010:
Development Assistance and Country Spending in Economic Uncertainty (2010) available at
http://www.healthmetricsandevaluation.org/publications/policy-report/financing_global_
health_2010_IHME (analyzing spending on HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, maternal and
child health, and non-communicable diseases)).
4. Kiyoshi Kurokawa et al., Italian G8 Summit: A Critical Juncture for Global Health,
373 THE LANCET, Feb. 14, 2009, at 526, 526–527 (2009), available at http://www.global-health-
summit.org/ghf2009/pdf/Lancet.pdf.
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cal patent holders, while theoretically required to encourage investments
in research and development, stands at odds with access to affordable
medicines.  The goodwill trademark proprietors build through investments
in advertising and marketing often trades off with costs imposed upon so-
ciety through excessive or deceptively-induced consumption.5  This antag-
onism has long played out in the domestic context, where lawmakers
conditioned intellectual property rights on their relationship with other
national health priorities. India, for example, prohibited pharmaceutical
patents for most of its history, a decision driven by the need to facilitate
access to affordable medicine for its massive population.6
While national politics played the major role in deciding the balance
between intellectual property protection and public health priorities, inter-
national agreements governing intellectual property and international
public health issues tended to acknowledge the threat strong IP protec-
5. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, Reducing Tobacco Use: A Re-
port of the Surgeon General 159, 166 (2000), available at http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/
data_statistics/sgr/2000/complete_report/pdfs/Chapter5.pdf (describing the various marketing
tactics of tobacco companies that have prompted regulatory action). See also ALICE LOUW &
MICHELLE KIMBER, The Power of Packaging, http://www.docin.com/p-208070978.html;
WORLD HEALTH ORG. [WHO], DIETS, GLOBALIZATION AND NONCOMMUNICABLE DISEASES
2, 22 (2002), available at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/9241590416.pdf; Cigarette
Packaging––What Rights for the Trademark Owner?, IP IN THE MEDIA, Sept.–Oct. 2010, at 1,
1–2, available at http://www.completeip.com.au/Newsletter.php (discussing plain packaging
debate on cigarette packaging); Gill Cowburn & Lynn Stockley, Consumer Understanding
and Use of Nutrition Labelling: A Systematic Review, 8 PUB. HEALTH NUTRITION, no. 1, 2005,
at 21, 21–22; Aron M. Levin & Irwin P. Levin, Packaging of Healthy and Unhealthy Food
Products for Children and Parents: The Relative Influence of Licensed Characters and Brand
Names, 9 J. Consumer Behav., Sept.-Oct. 2010, at 393, 393; Carolyn L. Engelhard & Arthur
Garson, Jr., Reducing Obesity: Policy Strategies From the Tobacco Wars, Urb. Inst. 1, at
34–35, 40–41 (2009), available at http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/411926_reducing_obesity
.pdf (explaining that governments in the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand have
found front-of-package, graphic warnings more effectively communicate nutritional informa-
tion to consumers than nutritional information boxes); David A. Marshal et al., Examining
the Relationship Between Product Package Colour and Product Selection in Preschoolers, 17
FOOD QUALITY & PREFERENCE 615, 615 (2006) (noting the importance of color in food
choice); Ike-Elechi Ogba & Rebecca Johnson, How Packaging Affects the Product Prefer-
ences of Children and the Buyer Behaviour of Their Parents in the Food Industry, 11 YOUNG
CONSUMERS: INSIGHT & IDEAS FOR RESPONSIBLE MARKETERS, no. 1, 2010, at 77, 79–80;
Pinya Silayoi & Mark Speece, Packaging and Purchase Decisions: An Exploratory Study on
the Impact of Involvement Level and Time Pressure, 106 BRIT. FOOD J., no. 8, 2004, at 607,
617; Joe B. Tye et al., Tobacco Advertising and Consumption: Evidence of a Causal Relation-
ship, 8 J. PUB. HEALTH POL’Y 492, 494–95 (1987) (emphasizing cigarette manufacturers’ in-
terest in advertising and promotion to maintain brand); Michael Skapinker, Europe Must
Think Again on Food Labels, FIN. TIMES, June 29, 2010, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/
3b1e26bc-83af-11df-b6d5-00144feabdc0,s01=1.html (“Research carried out for Which?, the
UK consumers’ association, and by scientists in Australia showed that consumers found it far
easier to identify healthy foods from the traffic-light system than from GDA labelling.”).
6. See Nitya Nanda & Ritu Lodha, Making Essential Medicines Affordable to the
Poor, 20 WISC. INT’L L.J. 581, 585 (2002); Vikas Bajaj & Andrew Pollack, India’s Supreme
Court to Hear Dispute on Drug Patents, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/03/07/business/global/indias-supreme-court-to-hear-long-simmering-dispute-on-drug-
patents.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
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tions posed for public health measures.  The Paris Convention for the Pro-
tection of Industrial Property, for example, allowed states to invalidate or
refuse to register trademarks that misled or deceived consumers and left
states free to grant compulsory licenses for reasons of public health. In any
case, international IP and international public health instruments have de-
pended on traditional diplomatic compliance mechanisms like good faith
fulfillment of obligations, consultations in the event of a dispute and tit-
for-tat sanctions.7 In short, they were enforced, often weakly, at the state-
to-state level.8
In the last 30 years, the global movement to elevate the international
legal status of intellectual property rights has also achieved substantial
gains. Industrialized states successfully tied intellectual property protec-
tions they desired to the reductions in tariffs and other barriers to imports
of foreign agricultural, clothing and textile goods sought by many develop-
ing countries, formalized in the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related As-
pects of Intellectual Property (“TRIPS”). Thousands of bilateral
investment treaties, largely forged between developed states and develop-
ing states, included strong protections for intellectual property rights that
frequently exceeded those in existing international agreements, even
TRIPS, and certainly beyond those typically found in national legislative
frameworks.9
Yet, unlike the earlier era when IP rights and international public
health law were roughly equivalent in their limited influence, the expan-
sion of international public health law has proceeded with its explicit and
implicit subordination to IP rights. For example, TRIPS provides a general
authorization for parties to “adopt measures necessary to protect public
7. Jennifer P. Ruger, Normative Foundations of Global Health Law, 96 GEO. L.J. 423,
438–39 (2008) (“Theoretically, the enforcement model of states’ behavior argues that states
are rational actors maximizing utility and thus will adhere to or violate treaties depending on
a cost-benefit calculation regarding their actions. Under this model and its compliance the-
ory, treaty regimes must have costly enforcement mechanisms to compel compliance.”).
8. Susy Frankel, WTO Application of “the Customary Rules of Interpretation of Pub-
lic International Law” to Intellectual Property, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 365, 378 (2006) (“GATT
panels did not have any ability to affect intellectual property laws, and there was no effective
international enforcement of international intellectual property treaties.”); J.H. Reichman,
Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual Property Protection under the TRIPS Compo-
nent of the WTO Agreement, 29 INT’L LAW. 345, 362 (1995) (“In retrospect, the weakness of
the international regime governing trademark protection derived only in part from the fail-
ure of key developing countries to adhere to the Paris Convention (or to its later versions),
and mainly from the lax enforcement of existing norms that state practice tolerated.”).
9. Burton Ong, The Trademark Law Provisions of Bilateral Free Trade Agreements,
in TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 229, 230
(Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis eds., 2008) (“Similarly, trademark law provisions
which have found their way into bilateral free trade agreements are also intended to fortify
and, in most cases, expand the domestic legal framework from which trademark owners de-
rive their exclusive rights.”).
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health” but requires that “such measures are consistent with the provi-
sions” of TRIPS.10
The confrontation between the growing strength of international intel-
lectual property law and national public health measures is well-docu-
mented. Even before TRIPS, IP rights holders successfully used
international agreements to thwart domestic public health policies. Con-
testing Australia’s 1992 effort to require tobacco manufacturers to sell cig-
arettes in plain packaging, British American Tobacco argued before the
Australian Senate that such a law would violate both the Paris Convention
for the Protection of Industrial Property and the Australian Constitu-
tion.11 Persuaded by the tobacco industry, the Australian government re-
jected the proposed regulations.12 In 1994, Philip Morris and RJR
Reynolds undertook a similarly successful campaign in Canada based in
significant part on the intellectual property protection provisions of
NAFTA. In 1998, pharmaceutical firms holding the patents to antire-
troviral drugs in South Africa brought suit against the government for its
efforts to use parallel imports and price controls to expand access to treat-
ment for its exploding HIV/AIDS population.13 Their suit was based in
significant part on the failure of the government’s legislative basis for the
measures to comply with TRIPS. The firms ultimately relented, although
with guarantees by South Africa to respect TRIPS obligations.14
The purpose of this Article is to argue that international intellectual
property law has not only erected substantial barriers to domestic or na-
tional measures taken in the interest of public health, but that intellectual
property protections embedded in a wide range of investment, trade and
IP treaties have substantially undermined existing and proposed interna-
tional public health law. From vaccine development orchestrated by WHO
(acting under the authority of the IHR) to the marketing of breast-milk
substitutes to pregnant and nursing mothers in developing countries to ef-
forts by national authorities to implement provisions of the FCTC, inter-
10. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 8, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869
U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS].
11. See WD & HO Wills (Aust.) Ltd., Submission to the Industry Commission Inquiry:
The Tobacco Growing and Manufacturing Industries 31–32 (Jan. 1994) [hereinafter Submis-
sion on Tobacco Growing], available at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/kpk33a99/pdf (noting
that the proposed packaging regulations “amount to a severe infringement of internationally-
registered intellectual property rights”).
12. See Adam Harvey, Doctors’ Plan to Put Cigarettes in Plain Wrap Fails, SYDNEY
MORNING HERALD, July 24, 1995, at 2 (quoting the spokeswoman for the Ministry of Health
as stating that “[u]nfortunately, [the proposal] is just not feasible . . . . We would have to buy
the tobacco companies’ trademarks, and that would cost us hundreds of millions of dollars.”)
(internal quotations omitted).
13. Ellen ‘t Hoen, TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents and Access to Essential Medicines, 3
CHI. J. INT’L L. 27, 30 (2002).
14. William W. Fisher III & Cyrill P. Rigamonti, The South Africa AIDS Controversy:
A Case Study in Patent Law and Policy, THE LAW AND BUSINESS OF PATENTS (last updated
Feb. 10, 2005), at 4–5, available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/South%20Af-
rica.pdf.
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national intellectual property law has systematically curtailed the intended
population health benefits promised by effective implementation of these
agreements.
Indeed, to the extent international public health agreements have in-
fluenced the conduct of states party to such agreements, I argue that they
have done so not because of the normative force the global health move-
ment has exercised on foreign policy, but precisely because of politics as
usual. The efforts of states like Brazil, India, Indonesia, South Africa, and
Thailand in securing affordable access to medicines and vaccines, enforc-
ing international marketing codes, and fending off IP-based challenges to
new public health interventions represents one manifestation of a world in
which the centers of hard and soft diplomatic power are diffusing from
Europe and North America to Africa, Asia and South America.15  In ar-
eas from arms control to climate change, this phenomenon is generally
known as “multipolarity,” distinguishing the bipolar Cold War rivalry be-
tween the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. and harkening back to nineteenth century
European politics dominated by Great Powers and characterized by an
ultimately unstable balance of power between them.16
On the one hand, this trend should encourage international public
health law advocates because it increases the likelihood that international
public health agreements will achieve at least partial population health
gains through unilateral or coordinated action by middle income states.
On the other hand, the fact that international public health law is so frail
in its confrontation with international IP agreements reveals the weak role
norm creation is playing in the context of international public health law.
The Article argues that as international public health advocates press for
agreements covering a wider range of issues like alcohol control, medical
research and innovation, and even a comprehensive convention on global
health, they must confront obstacles posed by international intellectual
property law more squarely than they now do, as well as shape their
agenda in light of the shifting alignment of global economic and political
power.
Part I of this Article traces the history of international public health
law as it evolved from a loose network of politicized (and subsequently
ineffective) international treaties in the late nineteenth century to a com-
prehensive movement toward a regime of conventions and protocols ad-
dressing the prevention and management of health threats that cross
international borders.
15. See, e.g., Gregory Schaffer, Michelle Ratton Sanchez & Barbara Rosenberg, The
Trials of Winning at the WTO: What Lies Behind Brazil’s Success, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 383
(2008).
16. See Robert B. Zoellick, The End of the Third World? Modernizing Multilateralism
for a Multipolar World, INT’L ECON., Spring 2010, at 40, available at http://www.international-
economy.com/TIE_Sp10_Zoellick.pdf (defining the new multipolar world). See also
GORDON A. CRAIG & ALEXANDER L. GEORGE, FORCE AND STATECRAFT: DIPLOMATIC
PROBLEMS OF OUR TIME 117 (1983); HENRY KISSINGER, DIPLOMACY 23–24 (1997).
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Part II traces the parallel history of international intellectual property
protections beginning with the 1883 Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property and growing to include a wide network of bilateral,
regional and multilateral investment and trade treaties.
Part III identifies episodes beginning in 1994 and concluding in 2012,
when these movements collided over a range of international public health
law instruments: the 1981 WHO Guidelines on the Marketing of
Breastmilk Substitutes, the 2005 International Health Regulations, and the
2005 Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. These episodes, in turn,
foreshadow likely conflicts should proposals for a Framework Convention
on Alcohol Control or an even wider-reaching Framework Convention on
Global Health materialize. These episodes illustrate the weak role of inter-
national public health law in shaping states’ behavior.
Part IV recommends solutions to the current problems, including the
strengthening of public health exceptions in bilateral investment treaties,
the withdrawal of certain dispute resolution procedures across a wide
range of treaties, the explicit management of intellectual property rights in
future international public health agreements, and the crafting of a global
public health agenda that focuses on political practicalities as shifts in
global power change the strength and influence of developing states.
I. THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF PUBLIC HEALTH LAW
The end of the 20th century ushered in the era of global public health.
In this “global health revolution”17, states have not only revised and ex-
panded the IHR and established the FCTC, but they have also re-oriented
developing states’ public health policy trajectories through their aid pro-
grams (like the U.S. President’s Emergency Relief for Aids in Africa
(PEPFAR)) and the development of health diplomacy. Major non-govern-
mental organizations like the William J. Clinton Foundation (now the Bill,
Hillary and Chelsea Clinton Foundation), the Bill and Melinda Gates
Foundation, and the Bloomberg Family Foundation have also allocated
significant and influential parts of their giving to the alleviation of global
public health threats ranging from malaria to tobacco use. Other major
international legal efforts lie in wait, like the American Public Health As-
sociation’s call for a Framework Convention on Alcohol Control and even
more ambitious proposals like a Framework Convention on Global
Health.18
17. See David P. Fidler, After the Revolution: Global Health Politics in a Time of Eco-
nomic Crisis and Threatening Future Trends, GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE 2–3 (2008),
http://ghgj.org/Fidler_After%20the%20Revolution.pdf. See generally U.N. Millennium Goals,
We Can End Poverty: Millennium Development Goals and Beyond 2015 (last visited Nov. 7,
2014), http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/bkgd.shtml  (“The eight Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs)––which range from halving extreme poverty to halting the spread of HIV/
AIDS and providing universal primary education, all by the target date of 2015––form a
blueprint agreed to by all the world’s countries and all the world’s leading development
institutions.”).
18. See Lawrence O. Gostin & Eric A. Friedman, Towards a Framework Convention
on Global Health: A Transformative Agenda for Global Health Justice, 13 YALE J. HEALTH
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Theoretically, this revolution represents the growing acknowledgment
that economic development depends on a population that enjoys access to
a basic level of health care and attention to conditions that accommodate
individual and public health, the “right to the highest attainable standard
of physical and mental health” under international human rights law.19
Practically speaking, the growth of international public health law is a re-
sponse to a globalized world of health threats including disease outbreaks
that cross international borders, food security and safety under liberalized
investment and trade rules and the worldwide marketing of products like
tobacco, alcohol and processed food that pose unique challenges for the
management of cancer, diabetes, heart disease, hypertension and
strokes.20 The economic and human cost of these burdens is vast and
growing.21 The emergence of HIV/AIDS in the 1980s as well as increas-
ingly threatening strains of influenza brought into vivid focus the inade-
quacy of existing international coordination mechanisms to handle
infectious diseases, including the manufacturing and distribution of
medicines and vaccines.22 Not only did the 1969 International Health Reg-
ulations only cover cholera, plague and yellow fever, but they also lacked
meaningful requirements for states to “detect, report, and respond to pub-
lic health events of international concern.”23 For example, tobacco con-
POL’Y L. & ETHICS 1 (2013); Donald W. Zeigler, APHA Approves Framework Convention
on Alcohol Control, ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND OTHER DRUGS (Am. Pub. Health Ass’n),
Winter 2007, [hereinafter APHA Report], available at http://www.apha.org/membergroups/
newsletters/sectionnewsletters/alcohol/winter07/alcoholcontrol.htm. See also JALI: JOINT
ACTION AND LEARNING INITIATIVE, HEALTH FOR ALL: JUSTICE FOR ALL––A GLOBAL CAM-
PAIGN FOR A FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON GLOBAL HEALTH (May 2012), available at http://
www.jalihealth.org/documents/manifesto.pdf.
19. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 12(1), Dec.
16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. See also Constitution of the World Health Organization, July 22,
1946, 14 U.N.T.S. 185 [hereinafter WHO Constitution] (“The enjoyment of the highest at-
tainable standard of health is one of the fundamental rights of every human being without
distinction of race, religion, political belief, economic or social condition.”).
20. See Emily Lee, The World Health Organization’s Global Strategy on Diet, Physical
Activity, and Health: Turning Strategy Into Action, 60 FOOD DRUG L.J. 569, 571 (2005) (“Ma-
jor noncommunicable diseases (NCDs) (e.g., cardiovascular disease, diabetes, cancers, and
obesity-related health conditions) now account for nearly sixty percent of global deaths and
almost half (49.5%) of the global burden of disease.  Without intervention, NCDs are ex-
pected to contribute nearly seventy-five percent of all deaths by the year 2020.”). See also
David Byrne, Is There a Lawyer in the House: The Law of Global Public Health?, 33 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 19, 19 (2005) (“In addition, the indirect costs of ill health, such as reduced
productivity, are very high.  One recent study has calculated the lifetime cost of cardiovascu-
lar disease in Germany.  Direct healthcare costs are estimated at $25 billion; indirect costs in
productivity are nearly double, at $48 billion. . . . One study estimates that the direct and
indirect costs of obesity, diabetes, and tobacco each top the $100 billion mark annually.”).
21. See Byrne, supra note 20, at 19.
22. See David P. Fidler & Lawrence O. Gostin, The New International Health Regula-
tions: An Historic Development for International Law and Public Health, 34 J.L. MED &
ETHICS 85, 86–87 (2006) (discussing the old approach compared to the new approach of the
IHR).
23. Kumanan Wilson, Barbara von Tigerstrom & Christopher McDougall, Protecting
Global Health Security through the International Health Regulations: Requirements and Chal-
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sumption, the principal preventable threat to individual and public health
in both developed and developing countries, annually kills approximately
five million people worldwide and is expected to kill one billion people in
this century, if current trends persist.24 Liberalized trade and investment
rules have shifted the massive disease burden from tobacco consumption
from developed to developing countries.25 Indeed, this shift explains in
part the origin of the FCTC.26
Similarly, the World Health Organization points to processed foods
heavily marketed toward children, expanding consumption of fast foods
and sugary beverages, as important factors in the emerging global obesity
epidemic.27 Obesity levels are rising throughout both developed and de-
veloping countries, playing some causative role in heart disease, diabetes,
certain cancers, osteoarthritis and strokes.28 The scope and strength of in-
ternational instruments targeting these threats has correspondingly
expanded.29
lenges, 179 CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 44, 46 (2008), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/
articles/PMC2464486/.
24. See WHO, WHO REPORT ON THE GLOBAL TOBACCO EPIDEMIC, 2008: THE
MPOWER PACKAGE 7 (2008), available at http://www.who.int/tobacco/mpower/mpower
report_full_2008.pdf. See also Allyn L. Taylor, An International Regulatory Strategy for
Global Tobacco Control, 21 Yale J. Int’l L. 257, 260–61 (1996). See generally THEODORE H.
TULCHINSKY & ELENA A. VARAVIKOVA, THE NEW GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH 23 (2d ed.
2009).
25. See Gro Harlem Brundtland, Burden of Disease and Best Practices: High-Level
Roundtable on Tobacco Control and Development Policy (Feb. 3, 2003), available at http://
www.who.int/dg/speeches/2003/brussels/en/ (discussing how in the coming years many to-
bacco-related deaths will be in developing countries).
26. See Ruger, supra note 7, at 436.
27. See WHO, DIET, NUTRITION AND THE PREVENTION OF CHRONIC DISEASES: RE-
PORT OF A JOINT WHO/FAO EXPERT CONSULTATION 61-65 (2003), available at http://
www.who.int/dietphysicalactivity/publications/trs916/en/gsfao_obesity.pdf (“Almost all coun-
tries (high-income and low-income alike) are experiencing an obesity epidemic, although
with great variation between and within countries.”). See also David Fidler, International
Law and Global Public Health, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 10 (2000) (“Liberalized trade in certain
food products is also thought to contribute to obesity problems in many countries.”).
28. See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT [OECD],
OBESITY AND THE ECONOMICS OF PREVENTION: FIT NOT FAT 16 (Sept. 23, 2010), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/21/19/46004918.pdf. See also Editorial, The Day of Diabetes:
Coming to a Person Near You, 376 THE LANCET 1513 (2010), available at http://
download.thelancet.com/pdfs/journals/lancet/PIIS0140673610620120.pdf (“Obesity cost the
Australian Government Aus$58•2 billion in 2008, according to Diabetes Australia, which
comprised Aus$8•3 billion of financial costs and Aus$49•9 billion in lost wellbeing—due to
disability or shorter life span.”).
29. See Just Balstad Haffield, Harald Siem & John-Arne Rottingen, Global Health
Governance: Examining the Global Health Arena: Strengths and Weaknesses of a Convention
Approach to Global Health Challenges, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 614, 617 (2010) (“In global
health there seems to be a drive towards adopting legally binding instruments, and the exam-
ples of recent international regulations are numerous (e.g., 2006 United Nations Convention
on Disabilities, 2005 International Health Regulations [IHR], 2003 WHO Framework Con-
vention on Tobacco Control, Medical Research and Development Treaty [current proposal
being discussed as a follow up of the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation
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This expansion, what I refer to as the internationalization of public
health law, conceivably includes agreements and political commitments
made across several issue-areas.30 For example, the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tions codified customary rules requiring access of medical personnel to the
injured and sick during armed conflicts and guaranteed prisoners of war
access to some level of health care. Similarly, arms control treaties like the
NPT, the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons
Convention are theoretically driven by those weapons’ potentially devas-
tating effect on human health and life.31 The 1978 Alma Ata Declaration
and the 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action marked im-
portant turning points in the history of the right to health without formal-
izing any express commitments by governments.32 Indeed, judges,
scholars, human rights activists and law-makers have never agreed upon
the content of the right to the highest attainable standard of health since
its codification in international human rights treaties.33 For purposes of
this Article, I limit the internationalization of public health law to interna-
tional legal regimes designed to address health threats, specifically those
undertaken by the World Health Organization and its predecessor, the In-
ternational Sanitary Conventions.
and Public Health] . . . .”). See also David P. Fidler, The Future of the World Health Organi-
zation: What Role for International Law?, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1079 (1998); Allyn
Lise Taylor, Making the World Health Organization Work: A Legal Framework for Universal
Access to the Conditions for Health, 18 AM. J.L. & MED. 301 (1992).
30. Ruger, supra note 7, at 424 (“In its broadest definition, [global health law] includes
all international legal regimes relevant to public health—international environmental law,
international humanitarian and human rights law, international trade and labor law, interna-
tional laws relating to arms control, and so on.  Construed more narrowly, it incorporates
only those international legal regimes specifically designed to address health threats.”).
31. Yet even in that context, the failure of the Biological Weapons Convention to
achieve the same enforcement regime strength as the Chemical Weapons Convention is at-
tributed in significant part to the concerns of biological agent manufacturers that monitoring
and site inspections may compromise valuable patents and trade secrets. See The Biological
Weapons Convention: Status and Implications: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Nat’l Secur-
ity, Veterans Affairs & Int’l Relations of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 106th Cong. (2000),
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-106hhrg74704/pdf/CHRG-106hhrg74704.
pdf. See generally Frank P. Grad, Public Health Law: Its Form, Function, Future and Ethical
Parameters, 49 INT’L DIG. HEALTH LEGIS. 19 (1998); David Fidler, The International Legal
Implications of “Non-Lethal” Weapons, 21 MICH. J. INT’L L. 51 (1999).
32. See generally Sam Halabi, Participation and the Right to Health: Lessons from In-
donesia, 11 HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS 49 (2009).
33. Compare Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217(III) A, Art. 25,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948), and International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, GA res. 2200A (XXI), 21 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 16) Art. 12, U.N. Doc.
A/6316 (1966), with Ruger, supra note 7, at 426 (“During this period, appeals to human rights
and the right to health in particular have dominated international health discourse, but the
human rights movement and the right to health especially have been viewed with considera-
ble skepticism and doubt.”)
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A. The International Sanitary Conventions
The internationalization of public health law began with an effort to
coordinate national efforts to contain disease. In the middle of the nine-
teenth century, states maintained their own standards for inspection and
quarantine of foreign goods and peoples that posed public health threats,
especially cholera.34  Between 1851 and 1892, predominantly European
powers met in an effort to conclude a list of internationally actionable
diseases and the appropriate methods by which their spread might be lim-
ited. The health positions taken by participating governments and medical
delegates were inevitably politicized, as the etiology of each disease (and
therefore its containment) necessitated measures that affected the com-
mercial interests of each state.35 Britain, for example, persistently opposed
measures that imposed significant burdens on maritime trade.36
Nevertheless, in 1892 the first International Sanitary Convention
(“ISC”) was concluded, which aimed to monitor westbound shipping
through the Suez Canal.37 Between 1893 and 1903, four more interna-
tional conventions were convened, steadily expanding the diseases
deemed appropriate for cooperation and control, the international adop-
tion of national policies for surveillance; quarantine of certain items and
persons; processes for sterilizing goods suspected of facilitating infection,
and the notification requirements for other participants. At the 1903 con-
vention, delegates agreed both on the need to codify in a single instrument
the preceding agreements as well as to establish an international health
organization.
These objectives of the 1903 ISC continued through the conventions
held in 1912, 1926 and 1938. During this time, two international health
organizations were established and the 1903 ISC was updated to reflect
advances in the control of infectious diseases. At that time, “numerous
international legal regimes addressing public health issues arose, particu-
larly treaties dealing with . . . opium and alcohol, occupational hazards,
and transboundary pollution.”38 As historians of the ISC conferences ob-
served, over time the agenda of the international meetings moved from
coordinating European responses to disease threats originating from Asia
to serving as an important forum for clinical researchers, bacteriologists,
physicians and other medical researchers to influence international law
and international relations as they affected the spread of disease.
34. See Norman Howard-Jones, The Scientific Background of the International Sani-
tary Conferences 1851–1938 (1975).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 41.
37. See David . P. Fidler, The Globalization of Public Health: The First 100 Years of
International Health Diplomacy, 79 BULL. OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION 842, 845
(2001).
38. Ruger, supra note 7, at 426 (“In the early part of the twentieth century, interna-
tional treaties focused on the control of narcotic drugs and ranged from the 1912 Interna-
tional Opium Convention to treaties dealing with trade in alcohol.”).
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The treaties’ stated objectives tended to go unfulfilled.  For example, it
took seven international conventions meeting between 1851 and 1892 to
finally generate the International Sanitary Convention of 1892, which was
limited to cholera.39 The eleventh International Sanitary Convention suc-
ceeded in creating an international health organization, the Office Interna-
tional d’Hygie`ne Publique, but it “had no authority to do field work within
a particular country, even at that country’s request.”40 In its 2005 revision
of the International Health Regulations, the WHO’s Intergovernmental
Working Group noted that the IHR had been developed “to replace the
largely ineffective international sanitary conventions, which were ham-
pered inter alia by a lack of consistency and uniformity in their implemen-
tation.”41 The purposes of the conventions became less legal in a strict
sense and more technocratic, changes which were to foreshadow the be-
havior of the World Health Organization upon its establishment in 1948.42
B. The World Health Organization
When international lawmakers established the World Health Organi-
zation, they intended to give it strong law-making and regulatory author-
ity.43 Article 19 of the WHO Constitution authorized it to conclude
treaties within its broadly worded mandate, while Article 21 gave the
World Health Assembly the authority to adopt legally binding recommen-
dations in five discrete areas: sanitary and quarantine regulations; nomen-
clatures on diseases, causes of death, and public health practices; standards
for diagnostic procedures for international use; standards for safety, pu-
rity, and potency of biological, pharmaceutical, and similar products mov-
ing in international commerce; and advertising and labeling of biological,
pharmaceutical, and similar products moving in international commerce.44
In addition, Article 22 established the binding legal effect of these regula-
39. WHO, ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HEALTH COOPERATION 8
(1991), available at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/1991/9290211407_(chp1).pdf.
40. WHO, FIFTY YEARS OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION IN THE WESTERN
PACIFIC REGION, 1948-1998: REPORT OF THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR TO THE REGIONAL COM-
MITTEE FOR THE WESTERN PACIFIC 10 (1998), available at http://www.wpro.who.int/about/
in_brief/RC49_03.pdf.
41. WHO Secretariat, Review and Approval of the Proposed Amendments to the Inter-
national Health Regulations, 2 A/IHR/IGWG/2/INF.DOC./2 (Jan. 27, 2005), available at
http://apps.who.int/gb/ghs/pdf/IHR_IGWG2_ID2-en.pdf. See also Fidler and Gostin, supra
note 22, at 92 (“Previous transformations in international law’s relationship with public
health have, over time, atrophied into insignificance. The history of the old IHR tells just
such a story. Further, the new IHR’s relevance to some pressing global health problems, such
as increasing access to HIV/AIDS treatment in the developing world or stemming the “brain
drain” of health workers from developing to developed countries . . . .”).
42. Fidler, supra note 27, at 1 (“In the decades since the Second World War, interna-
tional activities concerning public health carried out by intergovernmental organizations and
nongovernmental organizations made little use of international law.”).
43. See George Codding, Jr., Contributions of the World Health Organization and the
International Civil Aviation Organization to the Development of International Law, 59 AM.
SOC. INT’L L. PROC. 147, 147 (1965).
44. WHO Constitution, supra note 19, at arts. 19, 21.
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tions unless states opted out of them within the notification period, an
innovation that collapsed the usual drawn-out ratification process histori-
cally experienced in the international law-making process.45
Instead of exercising its formal legal authority, WHO embarked upon
several decades of technocratic observation, advising and support.46 The
World Health Assembly updated the International Sanitary Regulations in
1969, but the scope and strength of the IHR were minimal.47  WHO fo-
cused on epidemiological and technocratic expertise, giving itself a central
coordinating role between other international and non-governmental or-
ganizations and making far more frequent use of its Article 23 recommen-
dation-issuing authority.48 The World Health Assembly regularly issued
resolutions advising governments to undertake a range of measures re-
lated to its highly regarded epidemiological work, but steered almost com-
pletely clear of its law-making and regulation-issuing authority.49 These
resolutions covered a wide range of areas, from the marketing of breast-
milk substitutes (and maternal and child health more generally) to the de-
tection and prevention of infectious diseases to tobacco control.
1. International Code on the Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes
After the 1969 IHR, WHO aimed at using its Article 21 powers to
address child malnutrition in the International Code on the Marketing of
Breastmilk Substitutes, although the policy eventually took form as an Ar-
ticle 23 recommendation. In 1974, the World Health Assembly acknowl-
45. Id. art. 22.
46. See Fidler and Gostin, supra note 22, at 93 (“For decades, WHO has issued recom-
mendations on many public health problems; but the mixed record of state compliance with
WHO guidance should temper enthusiasm for the new IHR’s recommendation provisions.
The political controversies that surrounded WHO’s more aggressive actions during SARS
may deter WHO from taking similar actions under the new IHR. Laments about the erosion
of global and local public health capabilities suggest that WHO’s decades-long effort to im-
prove health conditions in developing countries has also met with only qualified success.”).
47. See Rebecca Katz & Julie Fischer, The Revised International Health Regulations: A
Framework for Global Pandemic Response, 3 GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE, 1, 2 (2010),
available at http://blogs.shu.edu/ghg/files/2011/11/Katz-and-Fischer_The-Revised-Inter
national-Health-Regulations_Spring-2010.pdf.
48. Ilona Kickbush, Wolfgang Hein & Gaudenz Silberschmidt, Addressing Global
Health Governance Challenges through a new Mechanism: The Proposal for a Committee C of
the World Health Assembly, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 550, 553 (2010) (“As the United Nations
technical agency for health, the WHO has been able to benefit from another form of legiti-
macy based on knowledge, expertise, and evidence.  Meanwhile a wide range of expert orga-
nizations in the global arena are also able to provide this type of legitimacy––but they do not
have the link to formal legal legitimacy, which allows the WHO to be a normative and stan-
dard setting organization.”).
49. Fidler, supra note 27, at 15 (“This isolation was not accidental but reflected a par-
ticular outlook on the formulation and implementation of international public health policy.
WHO operated as if it were not subject to the normal dynamics of the anarchical society;
rather, it acted as if it were at the center of a transnational Hippocratic society made up of
physicians, medical scientists, and public health experts. The nature and dynamics of this
transnational Hippocratic society led WHO to approach international public health without a
legal strategy.”).
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edged the declining rate of mothers exclusively breastfeeding for the first
six months of life, the period WHO recommends for both maternal and
child health.50 The recommendation is not driven by nutritional variations
between breastmilk and infant formula, but by the risks inherent in mixing
(especially with contaminated water) and administering formula as well as
the malnutrition that accompanies improper or imbalanced substitutes. As
Ted Kennedy phrased it:
Can a product which requires clean water, good sanitation, ade-
quate family income and a literate parent to follow printed in-
structions be properly and safely used in areas where water is
contaminated, sewage runs in the street, poverty is severe and illit-
eracy high?51
The evidence is persuasive: 13% of the 10.9 million deaths of children
younger than 5 years could be prevented every year if universal protec-
tion, promotion and support of breastfeeding were achieved.52 In addition,
breastfeeding plays a role in spacing pregnancies where contraception is
unavailable or contraception failures are common. The declining rates of
breastfeeding were attributed to food firms’ aggressive marketing of infant
formula, other milk products, cereals for infants, vegetable mixes, and
baby teas and juices, all of which fall under WHO’s definition of
breastmilk substitutes.53 These firms’ marketing practices either asserted
or implied nutritional and other health equivalencies with, or superiority
to, exclusive breastfeeding.
Between 1977 and 1979, children’s malnutrition became a priority for
the World Health Assembly and WHO began working with UNICEF on a
framework for “regulating inappropriate sales promotion of infant foods
that can be used to replace breast milk.”54  Those discussions revolved
around five themes: the encouragement and support of breast-feeding; the
promotion and support of appropriate and timely complementary feeding
(weaning) practices with the use of local food resources; the strengthening
of education, training and information on infant and young child feeding;
the promotion of the health and social status of women in relation to in-
fant and young child health and feeding; and the appropriate marketing
and distribution of breast-milk substitutes. In 1980, the World Health As-
sembly endorsed the WHO/UNICEF findings and recommended that
“there should be an international code of marketing of infant formula and
50. See World Health Assembly [WHA] Res. WHA27.43, (May 23, 1974).
51. Marketing and Promotion of Infant Formula in the Developing Nations, 1978:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health and Scientific Research of the Comm. on Human
Resources, 95th Cong. 1–2 (1978) (statement of Senator Kennedy).
52. See EMERGENCY NUTRITION NETWORK, HIV, INFANT FEEDING AND THE CODE 4
(May 2002), available at http://www.ennonline.net/pool/files/ife/hiv,-if-and-code.pdf.
53. See WHO, INTERNATIONAL CODE OF MARKETING OF BREAST MILK SUBSTITUTES
1 (1981) [hereinafter WHO MARKETING CODE], available at http://www.who.int/nutrition/
publications/code_english.pdf.
54. Id. at 4 n. 2.
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other products used as breast-milk substitutes.” In early 1981, WHO en-
dorsed a draft of the Code and recommended it to the World Health As-
sembly, which adopted it by an overwhelmingly vote.55
The International Code seeks to prevent companies from advertising;
implement strict labeling requirements, including a proscription on infant
images or other pictures which idealize breastmilk substitutes; limit influ-
ence on health care workers; and, prohibit distribution of free samples of
breast milk substitutes.56  The International Code, together with subse-
quent recommendations, is not a binding treaty, but represents an evi-
dence-based minimum standard that informs human rights obligations.57
Eighty-four states have enacted legislation implementing all or some as-
pects of the International Code while another fourteen have legislation
pending.58 Since the International Code’s adoption, food firms have sys-
tematically exploited its ambiguities and have directly challenged labeling
provisions that diminish intellectual property rights in trademarks and
tradenames.59
2. International Health Regulations
The 1980s and early 1990s witnessed the emergence of new infectious
diseases like HIV as well as the resurgence of older diseases like cholera.
In 1995, the World Health Assembly instructed WHO’s Director General
to revisit the IHR precisely because the regulations neglected “the emer-
gence of new infectious agents” and failed to provide for an adequate re-
sponse to those that were covered.60 The World Health Assembly
attributed these failures to the erosion of barriers between goods and peo-
ple.61 The protracted IHR revision process overlapped with acrimonious
55. See WHO, WHA Res. WHA34.22, (May 21, 1981), available at http://www.ibfan
asia.org/WHA/WHA34.22.pdf (providing the verbatim record of the discussion at the fif-
teenth plenary meeting).
56. See WHO MARKETING CODE, supra note 53, at 10–13.
57. See General Comment No. 15 (2013) on the Right of the Child to the Highest
Attainable Standard of Health, Comm. on the Rights of the Child, 62d Sess., Jan. 14,
2013––Feb. 1, 2013,  ¶ 44, CRC/C/GC/15 (Apr. 17, 2013). See also Sami Shubber, The Inter-
national Code of Marketing Breast-Milk Substitutes, 36 DIG. HEALTH LEGIS. 877, 884 (1985)
(indicating that WHA recommendations are not binding but they “carry moral or political
weight, as they constitute the judgment on a health issue of the collective membership of the
highest international body in the field of health.”).
58. U.N. INTERNATIONAL CHILDREN’S EMERGENCY FUND [UNICEF], INTERNA-
TIONAL CODE OF MARKETING OF BREAST MILK SUBSTITUTES (last updated May 26, 2012),
http://www.unicef.org/nutrition/index_24805.html.
59. See UNICEF REGIONAL OFFICE FOR WEST AND CENTRAL AFRICA, PROTECTING
BREASTFEEDING IN WEST AND CENTRAL AFRICA: 25 YEARS IMPLEMENTING THE INTERNA-
TIONAL CODE OF MARKETING OF BREASTMILK SUBSTITUTES 19 (2007), available at http://
www.unicef.org/wcaro/WCARO_Pub_Breastfeeding.pdf.
60. Revision process of the International Health Regulations (IHR), World Health Or-
ganization, www.who.int/ihr/revisionprocess/revision/en (last visited Nov. 7, 2014).
61. Katz & Fischer, supra note 47 at 2. The threat of the Ebola virus and the emerging
HIV/AIDS crisis (among other viruses) were major factors the global community considered
when advocating revisions to the existing IHR.
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negotiations between developing and developed states over the inclusion
of intellectual property protections in the global free trade regime.62 In
2003, the outbreak of SARS—and the hesitation of the Chinese govern-
ment to report or contain it—facilitated the 2005 revisions.63
The IHR (2005) was revised to encompass the detection and preven-
tion of all infectious diseases.64  Their scope was expanded “to include any
event that would constitute a public health emergency of international
concern.”65 “The Regulations now encompass public health risks whatever
their origin or source (Article 1.1), including: (1) naturally occurring infec-
tious diseases, whether of known or unknown etiological origin; (2) the
potential international spread of non-communicable diseases caused by
chemical or radiological agents in products moving in international com-
merce; and (3) suspected intentional or accidental releases of biological,
chemical, or radiological substances.”66 Acknowledging the importance of
communication and cooperation to successful detection and prevention of
communicable diseases, States Parties are obligated to “develop the means
to detect, report, and respond to public health emergencies . . . and estab-
lish a National IHR Focal Point [NFP]67 for communication to and from
WHO.”68 State Parties must inform WHO within 24 hours of an assess-
ment of any event that could be considered a “public health risk to other
States requiring a coordinated international response.”69
The drafters of the IHR (2005) included important limitations on the
measures states could impose when facing a public health “event.”70 These
limitations may be categorized in two non-mutually exclusive ways: 1) in-
dividual human rights and 2) the harmonization of the IHR with other
international agreements. Individual rights, especially those historically
62. See David P. Fidler, Revision of the World Health Organization’s International
Health Regulations, ASIL INSIGHTS (2004).
63. Katz and Fischer, supra note 47, at 2.
64. The stated purpose is to “prevent, protect against, control and provide a public
health response to the international spread of disease in ways that are commensurate with
and restricted to public health risks, and which avoid unnecessary interference with interna-
tional traffic and trade.” WHO, INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS (2005) 1 (2d ed.
2005), available at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2008/9789241580410_eng.pdf?ua=1.
65. Katz & Fischer, supra note 47, at 2.
66. Fidler and Gostin, supra note 22, at 86–87.
67. WHO, International Health Regulations (2005): Toolkit for Implementation in Na-
tional Legislation, 1, 7 WHO/HSE/IHR/2009.4 (January, 2009), available at http://
www.who.int/ihr/NFP_Toolkit.pdf (“The NFP is a national centre, established or designated
by each State Party.  The NFP must be accessible at all times for IHR (2005)-related commu-
nications with WHO IHR Contact Points.”).  As of July 2009, ninety nine percent of all States
have established an NFP.
68. Katz & Fischer, supra note 47, at 2–3.
69. Id. at 3. Once an incident has been reported, WHO will then “coordinate commu-
nications across nations, provide technical assistance to responding nations, and work with
international scientific experts to develop recommendations for mitigating the consequences
of the event.”
70. Fidler and Gostin, supra note 22, at 86–87.
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characterized as “civil” or “political,” often faced curtailment in the name
of public health measures. Isolation and quarantine, for example, impose
significant restrictions on individual liberty. Under the IHR (2005):
For a public health measure to restrict a civil and political right
lawfully, the measure must (1) respond to a pressing public or so-
cial need; (2) pursue a legitimate aim; (3) be proportionate to the
legitimate aim; and (4) be no more restrictive than is required to
achieve the purpose sought by restricting the right. The rights-re-
stricting measure must also be implemented in a non-discrimina-
tory manner (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), Articles 2.1 and 26).71
State Parties may implement health measures that achieve the same or
greater level of health protection as WHO recommendations. However,
they must be based on scientific principles, available scientific evidence,
relevant guidance or advice from WHO, and cannot be more restrictive of
international traffic or more invasive or intrusive to persons than reasona-
bly available alternatives that would achieve the appropriate level of
health protection.72
These provisions are explored, infra, as dovetailing with health excep-
tions and rules of interpretation provided in WTO agreements, especially
TRIPS. Because the 2005 IHR do not have a strong enforcement mecha-
nism,73 this ultimately privileges WTO jurisprudence as the benchmark by
which public health measures that states implement are evaluated.
Indeed, during the IHR negotiation process:
WHO member states expressed concerns that the expanded scope
of the new IHR would bring the Regulations into conflict with
other international agencies and treaties that addressed cross-bor-
der health risks - e.g., the International Atomic Energy Agency
(nuclear accidents); the World Trade Organization (health mea-
sures that restrict international trade); and the Codex Ali-
mentarius Commission (food standards and guidelines to protect
consumer health and promote trade in safe products). WHO ad-
dressed these concerns by demonstrating that few conflicts ex-
isted; amending the negotiating text to remove the small number
of possible conflicts; and adding provisions to facilitate coopera-
tion and coordination between WHO and other international or-
ganizations (e.g., Articles 14, 17(f), 57.1).74
71. Id., at 92.
72. See WHO, WHA Res. WHA58.3, art. 43 (May 23, 2005), available at http://
www.who.int/csr/ihr/WHA58-en.pdf.
73. See id. art. 56; Fidler & Gostin, supra note 22, at 91 (acknowledging the lack of an
enforcement mechanism).
74. Fidler & Gostin, supra note 22, at 91.
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The first meaningful test of the 2005 IHR occurred in the context of
the outbreak of the H1N1 influenza virus in 2009, although the outbreak
of avian flu in Indonesia in 2007 also tested the IHR’s underlying princi-
ples. These episodes demonstrated the confrontation between intellectual
property and public health as well as the role middle-income states played
in advancing the public health agenda. In 2007, Indonesia refused to share
flu samples precisely because of past experiences in which Western firms
patented genetic material in order to manufacture unaffordable vaccines.
3. The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control
Parallel to negotiations over the revised IHR, the World Health Or-
ganization also oversaw the drafting of its first public health treaty, the
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (“FCTC”). Just as the surge
in old and new infectious agents—tied in a significant way to globaliza-
tion—prompted calls for an improved set of International Health Regula-
tions, the FCTC represented the culmination of decades of public health
measures recommended by the World Health Assembly but persistently
undermined by a globally-coordinated effort undertaken by tobacco
firms.75
In 1995, Canada, Finland, Mexico, and Tanzania supported the idea of
an international agreement76 to regulate tobacco at the World Health As-
sembly, which adopted Resolution 48.11, advocating the use of an “inter-
national instrument” to curb global tobacco consumption.77 Also, “[a]
detailed outline of the proposed document was delivered  . . . setting forth
various options for international legal strategy for tobacco control and rec-
ommending the development and implementation of a WHO framework
convention on tobacco control . . . to promote global cooperation and na-
tional action for tobacco control.”78 In 1999, Member States finally estab-
lished both a WHO FCTC Working Group to draft core treaty elements
and an Intergovernmental Negotiating Body to develop the treaty text.79
The FCTC was designed as a compromise solution between a purely
recommendatory instrument and a binding convention. The FCTC estab-
75. See Sam Foster Halabi, The World Health Organization’s Framework Convention
on Tobacco Control: an Analysis of Guidelines Adopted by the Conference of the Parties, 39
GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 121, 129–32 (2010).
76. See generally WHO Director-General, The Feasibility of Developing an Interna-
tional Instrument for Tobacco Control, EB97/INF.DOC./4 (Nov. 30, 1995) (discussing plans
to develop an international instrument for tobacco control and how such an instrument
would need to be mutually agreeable to many nations).
77. See WHO, WHA Res. WHA48.11, (May 12, 1995), available at http://www.who.int/
tobacco/frame work/wha_eb/wha48_11/en.
78. Ruth Roemer, Allyn Taylor, & Jean Lariviere, Origins of the WHO Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 936, 937 (2005) available at http://
www.eurocare.org/content/download/11981/63683/version/1/file/Origins+of™he+WHO+FC
TC.pdf.
79. See Working Group Preceding the Intergovernmental Negotiating Body on the
WHO FCTC (1999–2000), WHO FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON TOBACCO CONTROL, http://
www.who.int/fctc/about/pre_neg_working_group/en/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2014).
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lished evidence-based provisions for curbing global tobacco consumption,
many of which focused on the advertising, labeling, marketing, packaging
and promotion of tobacco products.80 The convention has been followed
by additional action to enhance and clarify the strength and scope of the
treaty.81 The progress of this action, however, has progressed unevenly.
The FCTC’s Conference of the Parties (“COP”) quickly adopted imple-
menting guidelines for some of the treaty’s mandates, but struggled to
adopt others. A protocol on illicit trade in tobacco products languished for
years in the COP. Notwithstanding those efforts, the FCTC was adopted
by Member States in 2003 and entered into force on February 27, 2005.82
One hundred and seventy-eight parties have ratified or acceded to the
FCTC as of June 2014.83
C. Proposed Conventions
The somewhat disputed success of the International Code, the IHR
and the FCTC have led prominent public health scholars and organiza-
tions to call for an increase in the number of issue-areas over which na-
tional public health measures may be elevated to international fora and to
call for a more comprehensive, global approach to international public
health challenges.
1. Framework Convention on Alcohol Control
While modest in comparison to tobacco, the disease burden imposed
by alcohol consumption is substantial. Alcohol consumption not only re-
sults in greater harm to third parties relative to other drugs like cocaine
and heroin,84 but also has substantial deleterious effects on users, such as
increased risks of cancer and heart disease, traffic accidents, burns, poison-
ings, and drownings.85 Additionally, alcohol consumption facilitates risky
80. Halabi, supra note 75, at 153–63.
81. Id. at 162–63.
82. See Foreword to WHO FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON TOBACCO CONTROL, at vi
(2003) [hereinafter WHO FCTC], available at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2003/
9241591013.pdf?ua=1.
83. Parties to the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, WHO FCTC
(Mar. 27 2014, 09:25 CET), available at http://www.who.int/fctc/signatories_parties/en/
index.html.
84. See David J. Nutt et al., Drug Harms in the UK: A Multicriteria Decision Analysis,
376 THE LANCET 1558, 1560–61 (2010).  Alcohol consumption and its corresponding negative
effects are increasing worldwide. Alcohol-Related Ills Increasing Worldwide, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP. (June 25, 2009), http://health.usnews.com/health-news/family-health/brain-and-
behavior/articles/2009/06/25/alcohol-related-ills-increasing-worldwide. See also Charles D.H.
Parry, Alcohol Problems in Developing Countries: Challenges for the New Millennium, 2
SUCHTMED 216, 217–18 (2000), available at http://www.sahealthinfo.org/admodule/
Suchtmed.pdf (focusing on alcohol problems in developing countries and specifically what
needs to be done to reduce the burden of harm in such countries).
85. Etienne Krug & Benedetto Saraceno, Foreword, in WHO, ALCOHOL AND INJU-
RIES: EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT STUDIES IN AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE, at iv (Cheryl
J. Cherpitel et al. eds., 2009), available at http://www.who.int/substance_abuse/publications/
alcohol/en/.
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sexual behavior, contributing to the spread of HIV/AIDS and other sexu-
ally transmitted diseases.86
In 2010, the WHO published a report titled “Global Strategy to Re-
duce the Harmful Use of Alcohol” (the Report)87 in which it concluded
that “2.5 million people worldwide died of alcohol-related causes in 2004,
including 320,000 young people between 15 and 29 years of age.”88 WHO
recommended a number of interventions consistent with analogous FCTC
mandates, including: educating people on the consequences of alcohol
abuse; restricting the sale of alcohol to minors; implementing comprehen-
sive marketing restrictions; increasing taxes on alcohol products; and ad-
dressing illicit or informally produced alcohol. The Report is not binding:
it merely serves as a guide for member nations when adopting their own
alcohol control laws. Organizations like the American Public Health Asso-
ciation,89 the American Society of Addiction Medicine,90 the World Medi-
cal Association, as well as leading medical journals advocated an
international alcohol control treaty based in significant part on the FCTC
and WHO recommendations.91 Editors of one of these journals, the Lan-
cet, have also posed the question as to the desirability of a Framework
Convention on Obesity Control based in part on WHO’s Global Strategy
for Diet, Physical Activity and Health.92
2. Framework Convention on Global Health
Without explicitly criticizing the incrementalism inherent in an issue-
by-issue approach to international public health law,93 noted public health
scholar and advocate Lawrence Gostin and his collaborators have en-
dorsed a comprehensive approach to meet the “basic survival needs” of all
humans through a Framework Convention on Global Health.94 Uniting
the broad agreement between governments on a human right to health as
86. Lori A.J. Scott-Shelden et al., Alcohol Consumption, Drug Use and Condom Use
Among STD Clinic Patients, 70 J. STUD. ON ALCOHOL & DRUGS 762, 762–63 (2009).
87. WHO, GLOBAL STRATEGY TO REDUCE THE HARMFUL USE OF ALCOHOL 3 (2010),
available at http://www.who.int/substance_abuse/msbalcstragegy.pdf.
88. Id. at 5.
89. See APHA Report, supra note 18.
90. See Policy Statement on the Establishment of a Framework Convention on Alcohol
Control and the Exclusion of Tobacco and Alcohol from Trade Agreements, AM. SOC’Y AD-
DICTION MED., (2007), available at http://www.asam.org/docs/publicy-policy-statements/1est-
of-framework-convention-4-07.pdf?sfvrsn=0.
91. Allyn L. Taylor & Ibadat S. Dhillon, An International Legal Strategy for Alcohol
Control: Not a Framework Convention—At Least Not Yet, 108 ADDICTION 450, 450 (2012).
92. See Editorial, Urgently Needed: A Framework Convention for Obesity Control, 378
THE LANCET 741 (2011), available at http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0
140-6736(11)61356-1/fulltext.
93. See Lawrence O. Gostin et al., Letter to the Editor, A Framework Convention for
Obesity Control?, 378 THE LANCET 2049, 2068–69 (2011), available at http://
www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(11)61895-3/fulltext.
94. A FCGH would “seek innovative solutions for the most pressing health problems
facing the world in partnership with non-State actors and civil society, with particular empha-
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well as the health-related aspects of the Millennium Development Goals,
Gostin argues that a FCGH would address the substandard living condi-
tions in many developing states.95 These basic survival needs are sanita-
tion and sewage, pest control, clean air and water, tobacco reduction, diet
and nutrition, essential medicines and vaccines, and functioning health sys-
tems for the prevention, detection, and mitigation of disease and prema-
ture death.96 The Framework Convention on Global Health would commit
states to certain forms of support for these objectives,97 facilitate coopera-
tion and formation of expert communities addressing them, and impose a
range of mechanisms to enforce commitments.98
Under the current vision of the agreement, WHO would coordinate
states’ commitment “to a set of targets, both economic and logistic, and
[the dismantling of barriers] to constructive engagement by the private
and charitable sectors.”99 In legal terms, a FCGH could “commit states to
specific action . . . targeting the unhealthy conditions that combine with
poverty to exacerbate and perpetuate inequality.”100
The FCGH would be implemented in stages through FCTC-like gov-
ernance structures including a conference of the parties, secretariat, tech-
nical advisory body and representative roles for civil society groups.101
Initially, the FCGH would emphasize capacity building,102 priority set-
sis on the most disadvantaged populations.”  Lawrence O. Gostin, Meeting Basic Survival
Needs of the World’s Least Healthy People, 96 GEO. L.J. 331, 388 (2008).
95. See generally Lawrence O. Gostin, Meeting Basic Survival Needs of the World’s
Least Healthy People: Toward a Framework Convention on Global Health, 96 GEO L.J. 331,
331 (1997), available at http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/fac_lectures/11/.
96. See Lawrence O. Gostin & Eric A. Friedman, Towards a Framework Convention
on Global Health: A Transformative Agenda for Global Health Justice, 13 YALE J. HEALTH
POL’Y L. & ETHICS 1, 1 (2013).
97. Obligations would include: “[i]ncentives, forms of assistance (for example, finan-
cial aid, debt relief, technical support, subsidies, tradable credits), and levels of assistance,
with differentiated responsibility for developed, developing, and least developed countries.”
Gostin, supra note 94, at 388.
98. Enforcement tools include: “[i]nducements, sanctions, mediation, and dispute res-
olution.” Id.
99. A FCGH would provide several tools to streamline global health policy such as:
“[setting standards for] global health spending as a proportion of GNP; defin[able] areas of
cost effective investment to meet basic survival needs; build[ing] sustainable health systems;
and creat[ing] incentives for scientific innovation.”  Gostin, supra note 95, at 2.
100. Scott Buris & Evan D. Anderson, A Framework Convention on Global Health:
Social Justice Lite, or a Light on Social Justice?, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 580, 586 (2010).
101. This would facilitate the international community to focus on problems in a “step-
wise manner, avoiding potential political bottlenecks over contentious elements.” See Gos-
tin, supra note 94, at 388, 389.
102. See Gostin & Friedman, supra note 96, at 37.
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ting,103 engaging stakeholders,104 activity coordination,105 and progress
evaluation and monitoring.106
3. Medical Research and Innovation Treaty
Because of the controversial relationship between intellectual prop-
erty rights, the changing nature of pharmaceutical financing and innova-
tion and access to medicines in developing countries, the World Health
Organization has undertaken a series of studies aimed at addressing the
failure of a robust IP-rights protection regime to generate the medicines
and technologies developing countries need most.107 Drugs for diseases
for which treatments are available are too expensive because of patents
and trademarks, while the diseases for which the market will likely be pal-
try attract little research and development funding.108 Helping to address
this deficit are efforts coordinated with the World Trade Organization and
the World Intellectual Property Organization as well as major interna-
tional charities. In 2012, the WHO’s Consultative Expert Working Group
published Research and Development to Meet Health Needs in Developing
Countries: Strengthening Global Financing and Coordination, in which it
called for a binding framework treaty to address innovation and research
capacity in developing countries and to design a system to promote devel-
opment of treatments through incentive and other financing
mechanisms.109
The CEWG’s report extensively covered the obstacles strong IP pro-
tections pose for addressing medical research and development needs in
103. While well intentioned, many of the charitable donors are simply pouring re-
sources toward health issues that may or may not be the “root” of the problem in a given
country. See Gostin, supra note 94, at 384–85.  Because no single entity has the capacity to
solve these issues on their own, “consensus building and communal priority setting are sorely
needed.” Id. at 385.
104. Id. at 384.  This would enable a wide variety of state and non-state members to
pool resources and expertise.
105. Id.  As setting priorities and engaging stakeholders would essentially bring all play-
ers to the same page, activity coordination would harmonize the combined efforts.
106. Id.  This would ensure goals being set are met and the promises members make are
being kept. Id.  This is where previous initiatives have failed, as there is no effective follow-
up mechanisms for measuring progress. See id. at 386.
107. See Jack Lerner, Intellectual Property and Development at WHO and WIPO, 34
AM. J.L. & MED. 257, 260 (2008).
108. WHO, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT TO MEET HEALTH NEEDS IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES: STRENGTHENING GLOBAL FINANCING AND COORDINATION 1 (Apr. 2012), avail-
able at http://www.who.int/phi/CEWG_Report_5_April_2012.pdf (discussing progress of the
Consultative Expert Working Group’s work).  Multiple theories of intellectual property pro-
tection might apply to the same good.  For example, a pharmaceutical patent might apply to a
given compound, while trademark or trade dress protection might apply to the appearance of
a given pill. See Jeremy A. Greene & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Why Do the Same Drugs Look
Different? Pills, Trade Dress, and Public Health, 365 NEW ENG. J. MED. 83, 83 (2011).
109. WHO, supra note 108, at 113.  The proposed treaty has been variously called the
Essential Health and Biomedical R&D Treaty, the Medical Research and Development
Treaty, the Biomedical R&D Treaty, etc. Id. at 109.
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developing countries. The report squarely addressed existing IP instru-
ments, viewing a medical research and innovation “convention not as a
replacement for the existing intellectual property rights system but as a
supplementary instrument where the current system does not function”
and emphasizing the need for research and development breakthroughs to
be developed by other researchers.110 The recommended elements of the
proposed treaty suggest the difficulties member states face for attempts to
manage IP rights in a health-based treaty. For example, the only element
of the proposed treaty that specifically mentions intellectual property
reads:
[A global strategy on public health, innovation and intellectual
property will] encourage and support the application and manage-
ment of intellectual property in a manner that maximizes health-
related innovation, especially to meet the R&D needs of develop-
ing countries, protects public health and promotes access to
medicines for all, as well as explore and implement, where appro-
priate, possible incentive schemes for R&D.
This provision might be read to introduce some modification of the
strong IP rights that now characterize multilateral trade as well as bilateral
and regional investment treaties. But it also obscures an underlying ambi-
guity—“managing intellectual property to maximize health-related inno-
vation” might easily accommodate the current views of pharmaceutical
patent holders who argue that long periods of exclusive control are pre-
cisely the kind of incentive they need to maximize health-related
innovation.111
D. Public-Private Partnerships
It is in the context of the growing ties between the private and public
sectors that public health activists, scholars and organizations refer to the
growing importance of “governance” in solving public health problems at
the international level, a phrase which wraps together individuals, govern-
ments, firms, agencies and charities.112 Indeed, the World Health Organi-
zation’s Constitution incorporated the role of non-governmental
110. Id. at 122, 147.
111. Brian Till, How Drug Companies Keep Medicine Out of Reach, THE ATLANTIC,
May 15, 2013, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2013/05/how-drug-
companies-keep-medicine-out-of-reach/275853/.
112. See Kickbush, Hein & Silberschmidt, supra note 48, at 559 (“While a government
“governs” by using its constitutional powers to pursue specific goals, the term “governance”
rather looks at the interactive processes between different actors in the absence of a central
authority which lead to a specific outcome. It has frequently been associated with “govern-
ance without government,” a view that is increasingly challenged as the role of states in the
global governance system is better understood.”). See also Nan D. Hunter, Risk Governance
and Deliberative Democracy in Health Care, 97 GEO. L.J. 1, 6 (2008). See generally David
Gartner, Beyond the Monopoly of States, 32 U. PENN. J. INT’L L. 595 (2011).
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organizations, who by 1948 had undertaken significant efforts toward
eradicating infectious diseases and caring for injured and sick persons.113
The Global Fund, for example, is a public-private partnership dedi-
cated to collecting and allocating resources and funds for “a world free
from the burden of AIDS, TB and malaria.”114 Each needs-based country
has control over its own implementation of measures to prevent the
spread of these diseases and is provided funding based on the effectiveness
of the measures used.115 Despite pockets of political unpopularity and
misuse of money, Global Fund claims to have saved 6.5 million lives since
its establishment.116 Three million people have been provided AIDS treat-
ment, over 7.7 million have been treated for TB, and over 160 million
insecticide treated bed nets have been distributed.117
Similarly, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, together with
WHO, UNICEF, the World Bank and major pharmaceutical firms, estab-
lished the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunizations (“GAVI”).
GAVI is funded through the International Finance Facility for Immuniza-
tion (IFFI), which is itself funded by the governments of Australia, France,
Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, South Africa, Spain, Sweden and the
United Kingdom.118 Eligible states determine their immunization needs,
apply for funding support, and administer approved vaccination programs.
Under GAVI’s Advance Market Commitment (AMC) program, donors
commit funds to guarantee the price of vaccines once they have been de-
veloped. In exchange, companies promise to provide the vaccines at an
affordable price to developing countries.119
Global Fund and GAVI represent just two examples of public-private
partnerships, which number in the hundreds, and health-related NGOs,
which number in the tens of thousands.120 The participation of major non-
113. See WHO Constitution, supra note 19, at arts. 69–72.
114. World AIDS Day, THEGLOBALFUND.ORG, http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/events
/2013-12-01_World_AIDS_Day/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2014).
115. Principles, THEGLOBALFUND.ORG, http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/about/
principles/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2014).
116. John Heilprin, Fraud Plagues Celebrity-Backed Global Health Fund, HUF-
FINGTONPOST.COM (Jan. 23, 2011 4:54 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/01/23/
global-health-fund-fraud_n_812801.html.
117. Id. (A Global Fund spokesperson stated that “[w]ithout a spotlight, without inves-
tigations, and without some sort of accountability, it’s impossible to root out corruption . . .
[b]ut just simply withdrawing donations, I do believe, would condemn millions of people who
are not involved in the corruption to terrible fates.”).
118. See Lisa Clarke, The Responsibility of International Organizations under Interna-
tional Law for the Acts of Global Health Public Private Partnerships, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 55, 60
(2011).
119. See generally Susan Sell, Question for Global Governance in Intellectual Property
and Public Health, 77 TEMPLE L. REV. 363, 371 (2004).
120. Kickbush, Hein & Silberschmidt, supra note 48, at 554 (“The parallels to the domi-
nant position of the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation today - who in 2007 spent roughly as
much on global health as WHO’s budget for that year - are obvious. . . . They now have a
significant impact on setting agendas, shaping global health policies and implementing pro-
grams. Their sheer number is staggering: a 2007 estimate of AIDS-related NGOs alone
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governmental organizations in global public health is not new, although
the innovations current ones are introducing into administration and man-
agement are.121 In some ways, public-private partnerships are better able
to balance IP rights with their public health missions, working as they do
within the strong patent regimes donors generally enjoy.122 Global Fund
and GAVI, for example, are theoretically able to manage a range of sup-
plier behaviors through their contracts.123
II. THE EXPANSION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN
TRADE AND INVESTMENT TREATIES
With the exception of public-private partnerships, the international
coordination agreements outlined above are dependent on traditional no-
tions of treaty compliance including reciprocity, transparency, legitimacy,
mobilization and vertical integration (i.e., international rules and stan-
dards are internalized into national law).124 There are weak or no enforce-
ment mechanisms to speak of, the benefits of coordination and
mobilization serving as their own justifications. Whatever the strengths of
these justifications, they are threatened by a nearly perfect parallel devel-
opment in international law: international intellectual property protection.
Yet unlike the enforcement mechanisms embedded in international public
health law instruments, intellectual property rights holders enjoy, almost
uniformly, enforceable rights in these international agreements, even
when they conflict with public health measures.
These agreements range from the protections given intellectual prop-
erty rights holders under regional and multilateral trade treaties to the
broad scope of legal protections given both “investors” and “investments”
counted more than 60,000. More than 200 public-private partnerships are operating in fields
such as developing new medicines for neglected diseases, improving access to medical treat-
ment or pooling resources for specific goals.”).
121. Lawrence Gostin & Allyn Taylor, Global Health Law: A Definition and Grand
Challenges, 1 PUB. HEALTH ETHICS 53, 57 (2008) (“Indeed, a number of modern cutting-edge
global health governance initiatives eschew formal international legal regimes, such as the
Global Fund, Global Health Security Initiative (GHSI), International Drug Purchase Facility
(UNITAID) and International Finance Facility for Immunisation.”).
122. Suppliers include bidders, agents, intermediaries, consultants, contractors, affili-
ates, employees, subcontractors, and agents. THE GLOBAL FUND TO  FIGHT AIDS, TUBER-
CULOSIS, AND MALARIA, SANCTIONS PROCEDURES RELATING TO THE CODE OF CONDUCT
FOR SUPPLIERS 1, available at http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/documents/governance/ (last
visited Nov. 7, 2014).
123. See generally id.
124. Just Balstad Haffield, Harald Siem & John-Arne Rottingen, Global Health Gov-
ernance: Examining the Global Health Arena: Strengths and Weaknesses of a Convention Ap-
proach to Global Health Challenges, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 614, 616 (2010). See generally
ABRAM & ANTONIA CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL
REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 135 (1995); Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept of Compliance as
a Function of Competing Conceptions of International Law, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 345 (1998);
Francesco Parisi & Nita Ghei, The Role of Reciprocity in International Law, 36 CORNELL
INT’L L.J. 93 (2003); Oscar Schachter, Towards a Theory of International Obligation, 6 VA. J.
INT’L L. 300 (1968).
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under bilateral investment treaties. The upshot of these parallel, contradic-
tory legal mechanisms is the frustration of global health law objectives like
reduced tobacco use, expanded access to vaccines in the event of pan-
demic or even the creation of mutual trust necessary for international pub-
lic health treaties to work. The end result is that robust IP protection that
accompanies trade liberalization works in persistent opposition to public
health objectives.125
A. The 1883 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property
Contemporaneously with late nineteenth century efforts to establish
the first international public health law treaties, a small group of states
sought to protect their citizens’ industrial and intellectual property as they
moved across borders.126 Disparate national patent and trademark re-
gimes meant that rights holders in one state might lose patent or trade-
mark protection in another if they did not simultaneously file for
protection in all relevant states.127 Like public health law, intellectual
property law was essentially national in nature, though growing interna-
tional trade mobilized efforts toward an international approach to legal
barriers for IP. The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property created a legal union between participating states in which for-
eign industrial design, patent and trademark applications received the
same treatment as national applications; covered intellectual property first
protected in one state received priority in other participating states; and
codified some common substantive protections.128 The treaty also specifi-
cally addressed forms of unfair competition not related to patents or
trademarks, provisions that were subsequently strengthened when the par-
ties revised the treaty in several conferences from 1886 to 1967.129 Mem-
bership in the treaty grew from 11 parties in 1883 to 174 in 2013.
125. See Kojo Yelpaala, Quo Vadis WTO?  The Threat of TRIPS and the Biodiversity
Convention to Human Health and Food Security, 30 B.U. INT’L L.J. 55, 85–86 (2012) (“Trade
and investment liberalization have produced certain negative externalities in health in devel-
oping countries. Trade liberalization has enabled greater availability of highly processed, cal-
orie-rich and nutrient-deprived food in developing countries.  Trade liberalization has also
opened up the markets of developing countries to other high health-risk products such as
tobacco.”).
126. See G.H.C. BODENHAUSEN, GUIDE TO THE APPLICATION OF THE PARIS CONVEN-
TION FOR THE PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY 9 n.1 (1968) (listing Belgium, Brazil,
France, Guatemala, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Salvador, Serbia, Spain and Switzerland as
initially ratifying).
127. See Seth M. Reiss, Commentary on The Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property, LEX-IP.COM, http://www.lex-ip.com/Paris.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2014).
128. See generally id.
129. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 10bis, Mar. 20, 1883,
25 Stat. 1372 [hereinafter Paris Convention], available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/
text.jsp?file_id=288514 (prohibiting “(i) all acts of such a nature as to create confusion by any
means whatever with the establishment, the goods, or the industrial or commercial activities,
of a competitor; (ii) false allegations in the course of trade of such a nature as to discredit the
establishment, the goods, or the industrial or commercial activities, of a competitor; (iii) indi-
cations or allegations the use of which in the course of trade is liable to mislead the public as
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While the treaty never specifically addressed the relationship between
international intellectual property protection and public health, it did cre-
ate exceptions that foreshadowed the principal conflicts occurring between
1994 and 2012. Compulsory licenses were always contemplated for public
health reasons, while the addition of Article 6quinquies(B)(iii) in 1934 al-
lowed the denial of registration or the invalidation of trademarks that
might mislead consumers.130  In short, the Paris Convention, later incorpo-
rated into the WTO’s TRIPS Agreement, provided broad exceptions for
the compulsory licensing of patents related to medicines and prohibited
trademarks that might create false impressions as to products’ health-re-
lated attributes.131
Like public health treaties originating at the same time, the Paris Con-
vention tended to suffer from underenforcement as well as the absence of
a specific forum to which an aggrieved IP rights holder might resort. Com-
pliance and complaints were largely diplomatic matters.132 For example,
the international organization created to administer the Paris Convention
and, later, the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artis-
tic Works—the United International Bureaux for the Protection of Intel-
lectual Property (“BIRPI,” its French acronym133)—never enjoyed more
than a formal coordinating role and was, strictly speaking, an arm of the
Swiss government.134
From 1893 to 1967, BIRPI oversaw revisions to the major treaties in-
cluding the ways in which the agreements would govern new technologies;
entry by newly independent former colonies; and increasing efforts to in-
clude substantive law in the treaties.135 In 1967, the parties agreed to
transform BIRPI into an international organization, the World Intellectual
Property Organization (“WIPO”), which operated formally from 1970 and
as a specialized agency of the United Nations from 1974. WIPO has largely
overseen the growing body of IPR harmonization and substantive law
treaties like the Patent Cooperation Treaty, the Trademark Law Treaty
and the (slowly forming) Substantive Patent Law Treaty. It is funded
largely through fees paid by private users of the treaties it develops.136
to the nature, the manufacturing process, the characteristics, the suitability for their purpose,
or the quantity, of the goods.”).
130. See id. at arts. 5, 6 quinquies(B)(iii). See also Bodenhausen, supra note 126, at 70,
116 (indicating that “[an appropriate condition for issuing a compulsory license] may be the
case when patents concern vital interests of the country in the fields of military security or
public health,” and also indicating that “[t]he purpose of this addition [to Article 6quin-
quies(B)(iii)] was to enable member States to refuse or invalidate trademarks containing
suggestions that the goods concerned possessed non-existing qualities.”).
131. Id.
132. But see Reichman, supra note 8, at 385.
133. See generally Christopher May, The Pre-History and Establishment of the WIPO, 1
WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. J. 16, 19 (2009) (indicating that BIRPI stands for Bureaux In-
ternationaux Re´unis pour la Protection de la Proprie´te´ Intellectuelle).
134. See id.
135. See id. at 19–21.
136. See id. at 24.
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Because WIPO became a specialized agency of the United Nations in the
same period that developing and newly independent states were pressing
for a New International Economic Order, it never fully served the inter-
ests of strong international intellectual property protections.137
B. International Trade Law
International intellectual property law became decidedly more influ-
ential when it was not only folded in with the international free trade re-
gime, but was equipped with judicial enforcement requirements that gave
IP rights holders the capability to enforce those rights in domestic courts
and administrative tribunals. Because the Paris Convention and other ef-
forts at international IP protection had failed to satisfy the demands of
states with strong IP rights-holding constituencies, individual states had
often regulated IP practices through domestic trade statutes.
For example, in the United States, Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act
“authorizes the President to take all appropriate action, including retalia-
tion, to obtain the removal of any act, policy, or practice of a foreign gov-
ernment that violates an international trade agreement or is unjustified,
unreasonable, or discriminatory, and that burdens or restricts U.S. com-
merce.” Private IP rights holders were authorized to file 301 petitions,
many of which focused on failures to protect IP rights abroad. In 1988,
Congress enhanced Section 301 by requiring the Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative to compile “Special 301” Reports which identify countries
that do not provide “adequate and effective protection” of intellectual
property rights or “fair and equitable market access for persons that rely
on intellectual property protection.”138
Yet even efforts like these confront diplomatic and political limits. For
example, the 2011 Report identified two key U.S. allies, Canada and
Israel, as having “serious intellectual property rights deficiencies,” yet
resolving those deficiencies is likely to be complicated by other diplomatic,
commercial and strategic priorities.139 Therefore, from states with power-
ful IP rights-holding constituencies, the desirability of an agreement that
gave automatic rights to enforceability was obvious.
1. The WTO
After the failure of the International Trade Organization to obtain US
support during the Truman administration, the less centralized General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) became the organizing treaty
under which states reduced official or governmental barriers to trade.
137. See generally Justin Hughes, A Short History of “Intellectual Property” in Relation
to Copyright, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1293 (2012).
138. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2009 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 1–31, 39
(2009).
139. OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, USTR RELEASES AN-
NUAL SPECIAL 301 REPORT ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, available at http://
www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2011/may/ustr-releases-annual-special-301-
report-intellectual-p.
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Through eight rounds of negotiations stretching over more than 40 years,
trading states gradually lowered tariffs as well as “non-tariff barriers” to
trade like customs procedures, import licensing requirements and export
subsidies. The so-called Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations com-
menced in 1986 and lasted through 1994, when the World Trade Organiza-
tion was established.
The “World Trade Organization” refers to about 60 agreements, sev-
eral of which affect participating states’ ability to establish and regulate
their health systems. The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
(TBT) governs potentially trade-restrictive public health regulations while
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS) requires that states pass laws providing foreign intellectual-prop-
erty rights holders with a number of administrative and judicial protec-
tions. The Agreement on Sanitary and Photosanitary Measures (SPS)
establishes the principles by which states may regulate food safety. The
WTO agreements provide for relatively circumscribed situations in which
public health measures may prevail over liberal trading rules.140
2. TRIPS
TRIPS is by far the most controversial of the WTO agreements with
respect to international public health law.141 Unlike the general theory of
reducing barriers to trade that justified GATT, TRIPS was theoretically
justified by the need to increase legal protections for intellectual property
rights holders in order to facilitate the expansion of products, processes,
accompanying trademarks, and creative works into new markets.142
Many economists agree that in most circumstances, eliminating barri-
ers to trade between nations is net welfare increasing for each nation and
for the global economy. Indeed, economists argue that a state should
adopt open trade policies even if others do not. As Paul Krugman puts it,
“[i]f economists ruled the world, there would be no need for a World
Trade Organization. The economist’s case for free trade is essentially a
unilateral case: a country serves its own interests by pursuing free trade
regardless of what other countries may do.”143
The issue of the optimal level of intellectual property protection, how-
ever, is not so straightforward. Most economists agree that nations should
adopt some intellectual property laws, although what the content of these
140. See John D. Blum, Reshaping the Global Legal Structures of Public Health, 12
MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 207, 218 (2004); Leon E. Trakman, The ICSID Under Siege, 45 COR-
NELL INT’L L.J. 603, 615 (2012).
141. See Yelpaala, supra note 125, at 63, 66 (“Barely half a decade after the WTO came
into force, the threat posed by TRIPS to human health and food security was widely recog-
nized by the WTO and international organizations.”).
142. See TRIPS, supra note 10, art. 16.
143. Paul Krugman, What Should Trade Negotiators Negotiate About?, 35 J. ECON. LIT.
113, 113 (1997).
Summer 2014] Internationalization of Public Health Law 745
laws should be is a matter of significant disagreement. Intellectual prop-
erty rules involve distributional issues.144
TRIPS’ approach was to grant patent, copyright and trademark hold-
ers rights to certain minimal statutory protections as well as resort to ad-
ministrative and judicial processes to enforce those rights.145 Member
states may pass protections greater than those detailed in TRIPS146 but
additional protections must be extended to nationals of other member
states.147 In addition to substantive provisions, TRIPS also outlines a com-
prehensive framework for civil adjudication of IP rights.148  Member states
must create private causes of action149 as well as remedies including in-
junctions, money damages, and the use of border restrictions.150 States
must also give IP rights holders access to judicial review of all administra-
tive decisions concerning their IP laws.151
Prior to the Uruguay Round, the trade liberalization negotiation pro-
cess had been largely driven by the trade agenda of developed states; agri-
culture was for the most part excluded and the important bargains were
struck between the industrialized countries.152 The Uruguay Round, by
contrast, involved a greater range of issues, many of which were long-
standing priorities of developing states. Their interests in lowering barriers
to trade in agricultural goods, clothes and textiles resulted in a “grand bar-
gain” in which they agreed to impose strong monopoly protections for
copyrights, trademarks, and, most importantly from the North American,
Japanese and European perspective, copyrights and patents.153
144. Rachel Brewster, The Surprising Benefits to Developing Countries of Linking Inter-
national Trade and Intellectual Property, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 6 (2011).
145. See generally NUNO PIRES DE CARVALHO, THE TRIPS REGIME OF PATENT
RIGHTS (3d ed. 2010) (providing background explanation of the history and economics of
patent rights under TRIPS); GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: KNOWLEDGE, AC-
CESS AND DEVELOPMENT (Peter Drahos & Ruth Mayne eds., 2002).
146. TRIPS, supra note 10, art. 1(1).
147. See id. art. 3(1) (providing the caveat that this provision is subject to any Paris
Convention exceptions).
148. Id. art. 42.
149. See Patricia L. Judd, Towards a TRIPS Truce, 32 MICH. J. INT’L L. 613, 622 (2011).
150. TRIPS, supra note 10, arts. 44–45, 57.
151. Id. art 31(i). See also id. arts. 44–45 (explaining injunctive relief and damages); id.
art. 41(4) (“Parties to a proceeding shall have an opportunity for review by a judicial author-
ity of final administrative decisions and, subject to jurisdictional provisions in a Member’s
law concerning the importance of a case, of at least the legal aspects of initial judicial deci-
sions on the merits of a case.”).
152. H.E. Haralambides, M. Westeneng & S. Zou, GATT and its Effects on Shipping
and Ports, in KMI/IAME CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE RELATIONS AND WORLD
SHIPPING 1, 3 (1994), available at http://www.academia.edu/2531450/GATT_and_its_Effect
_on_Shipping_and_Ports.
153. Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of
International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 2 (2004); Arvind Sub-
ramanian, Medicines, Patents, and TRIPS: Has the Intellectual Property Pact Opened a Pan-
dora’s Box for the Pharmaceuticals Industry?, FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT, Mar. 2004, at 22,
available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2004/03/pdf/subraman.pdf.
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With respect to the relationship between the international public
health law movement and the international intellectual property protec-
tion movement, the Uruguay Round decidedly subordinated the former to
the latter. Developing states won some flexibility with respect to imple-
mentation of TRIPS obligations, most notably through Articles 7 and 8,
which respectively emphasized the need for intellectual property rules to
allow for development and technology transfer as well as measures neces-
sary to protect public health and nutrition.154 Article 8 did not provide a
general public health exemption from TRIPS implementation but rather
conditioned those measures on TRIPS compliance.155 Meanwhile, Article
31 of TRIPS allows for nonconsensual authorizations of patents—a provi-
sion whose importance was elevated by the Doha Declaration on the
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health—but requires that those authoriza-
tions be accompanied by appellate access to national courts or “direct
higher authority.”156
These protections effectively imparted individually enforceable rights
to IP rights holders. Jerome Reichmann detailed how strong these rights
may be: “[Developed countries] expect developing countries to implement
[their] obligations concerning domestic, judicial and administrative en-
forcement of foreigners’ intellectual property rights, including detailed
provisions governing the discovery of evidence, rights to counsel, injunc-
tions, damages and temporary restraining orders. These provisions mean
business.”157 States Parties are not required to allocate more resources
toward enforcement of IP rights than “law in general,” so many individual
IP rights-holders may not see a sufficient payoff to invest resources in pur-
suing individual civil actions to vindicate property rights. But the eco-
nomic sectors most closely tied to human health—food, tobacco, alcohol
and pharmaceuticals—are precisely those in which IP rights holders are
most likely to try to preserve substantial investments in advertising, re-
search and development.158
3. SPS and TBT Agreements
Relatedly, measures affecting the labeling of food or beverage con-
tainers may not only be challenged on the grounds that they affect trade-
marks on packaging and labeling, but also as trade-restrictive regulations
under the SPS and TBT agreements. These agreements do not apply to
154. See TRIPS, supra note 10, arts. 7–8.
155. See TRIPS, supra note 10, art. 8.
156. TRIPS, supra 10, art. 31; Peter Drahos, Intellectual Property and Pharmaceutical
Markets: A Nodal Governance Approach, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 401, 408–09 (2004).
157. Reichman, supra note 8, at 385.
158. Brewster, supra note 143, at 6, 34 (“[T]he civil system might, in practice, be far
more important than the administrative or criminal system if foreign rights-holders are will-
ing to bear the costs of detecting and prosecuting intellectual property infringements . . . . In
areas such as pharmaceuticals, private suits are cost-effective because the capacity to reverse
engineer and reproduce pharmaceuticals is not as widespread.  There may be only a few firms
in the country.”).
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intellectual property rights per se but may, together with IP rights claims,
cumulatively weigh against public health interventions. The SPS Agree-
ment authorizes states to adopt “sanitary and phytosanitary” measures to
ensure the safety of food and the prevention of imported pests and dis-
eases, but limits the trade restrictiveness of those measures and encour-
ages the use of internationally accepted standards like those issued by the
Codex Alimentarius Commission (“Codex”).159 Empowering Codex stan-
dards for their WTO relevance has correspondingly pressured decisions
toward their free trade compatibility. Emily Lee has detailed this process
in the following way:
The standard-setting process seems to present a unique “demo-
cratic” setting in which industry representatives, government offi-
cials, and NGOs can negotiate and forge a unified position, but in
practice, the distribution of influence is weighted heavily to reflect
industry concerns. The composition of national delegations in Co-
dex meetings increasingly reflects the commercial importance of
Codex decisions, as does the increasing difficulty in the negotia-
tion of general principles for the elaboration of standards. Also,
“Proceedings of the Commission often have turned into trade bat-
tlegrounds and forums for deregulation where decisions tend to
reflect political compromises designed to promote international
trade at the expense of human health.”160
European Union officials, for example, argued in 1994 that U.S. nutrition
labels restricted trade.161
Similarly, the TBT Agreement encourages states to base regulatory
measures on international standards when available and appropriate. The
easiest way to accomplish this is by adopting an accepted international
159. See Antonia Eliason, Science Versus Law in WTO Jurisprudence: The
(Mis)Interpretation of the Scientific Process and the (In)Sufficiency of Scientific Evidence in
EC-Biotech, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 341, 361 (2009).
160. Lee, supra note 20, at 595. See also Patrick Zylberman, Making Food Safety an
Issue: Internationalized Food Politics and French Public Heath from the 1870s to the Present,
48 MED. HIST. 1, 25 (2004) (“The SPS Agreement . . . intended that science should play the
key role so that food safety could be separated from high foreign policy.  Detached from
culture, the issue of food protection would thus depend on a single regulator––science, the
criterion for evaluating all other standards.  This was, of course, either arrant naivety or
cynicism.”).
161. Lee, supra note 20, at 576 (citing EUR. COMM’N, 15H ANNUAL REPORT ON UNITED
STATES BARRIERS TO TRADE AND INVESTMENT 23 (1999) (The report states that U.S. nutri-
tion labeling requirements differ from international labeling standards set by the Codex Ali-
mentarius Commission and present “serious negative consequences on EU-U.S. trade in
foodstuffs.”). See Obijiofor Aginam, Food Safety, South-North Asymmetries, and the Clash
of Regulatory Regimes, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1099, 1100–03 (2007) (discussing the
issues of food safety within the context of economic globalization and the regulatory regime
of WTO SPS). For a discussion of the interaction between WTO trade rules (GATT XX(d)
health exemptions and a review of the SPS process) with other GATT rules and domestic
health regulatory regimes, see CATHERINE BUTTON, THE POWER TO PROTECT: TRADE,
HEALTH AND UNCERTAINTY IN THE WTO (2004).
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standard like those issued by the International Standards Organization
(“ISO”). However, the process by which those standards are developed
are not only opaque, but are dominated by the industries affected by the
standards issued. The tobacco industry, for example, used the ISO stan-
dard for low-tar labeling as part of its broader effort to convince the public
that a “safer” cigarette existed.162
4. The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement
The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (“ACTA”)163 represents
the codification of principles advanced in a number of initiatives under-
taken by developed states to enhance protections for intellectual property
holders beyond what TRIPS achieved.164 According to the U.S. Trade
Representative, “the goal [of ACTA] is to set a new, higher benchmark for
enforcement that countries can join on a voluntary basis. . . . ACTA will
include commitments in three areas: (1) strengthening international coop-
eration, (2) improving enforcement practices, and (3) providing a strong
legal framework for IPR enforcement.”165 After eleven rounds of negotia-
tions, the final ACTA text was adopted166 in May 2011.167
162. Stella A. Bialous & Derek Yach, Whose Standard Is It, Anyway? How the Tobacco
Industry Determines the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) Standards for
Tobacco and Tobacco Products, 10 TOBACCO CONTROL 96, 103 (2001).
163. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTA-
TIVE (Oct. 11, 2011), http://www.ustr.gov/acta [hereinafter ACTA].
164. Peter K. Yu, Six Secret (and Now Open) Fears of ACTA, 64 SMU L. REV. 975,
977–78, 980–81 (2011) (“Originated more than five years ago, ACTA built on pre-existing
anti-piracy and anti-counterfeiting efforts, such as the Global Congress on Combating Coun-
terfeiting and Piracy (Global Congress), Japan’s proposal for an anti-counterfeiting treaty,
the United States’ STOP! (Strategy Targeting Organized Piracy) Initiative, and the European
Commission’s Strategy for the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in Third Countries
(E.U. IPR Enforcement Strategy). . . . In November 2005, Japan officially presented the pro-
posal for an anti-counterfeiting treaty in the Second Global Congress in Lyon, France, an
event jointly organized by the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), the
World Customs Organization (WCO), and the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO) in partnership with the International Chamber of Commerce and its new Business
Action to Stop Counterfeiting and Piracy (BASCAP) initiative, the International Trademark
Association (INTA), and the International Security Management Association.”).
165. Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Ambassador Schwab An-
nounces U.S. Will Seek New Trade Agreement to Fight Fakes (Oct. 23, 2007), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/ambassador-schwab-announces-us-will-seek-new-trade-agreement-fight-
fakes.
166. Eight parties have signed ACTA: Australia, Canada, Japan, Korea, Morocco, New
Zealand, Singapore, and the United States. ACTA, supra 163.  Mexico, and Switzerland were
participants and are supporters, but have yet to sign the agreement. Id. The E.U. signed
ACTA on January 26, 2012, but it still needs to be signed and ratified by all 27 Member States
because ACTA contains “criminal enforcement provisions, an area that is considered of
‘shared’ competence between the EU and its Member States.” What ACTA is About, EUR.
COMM’N (May 4, 2012, 5:00 PM), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2012/january/tradoc
_149003.pdf.
167. See ACTA, supra note 163.
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Originally aiming to combat the counterfeiting of goods and piracy in
international markets, ACTA contains increased criminal sanctions for
IPRs infringement and stronger border measures168 to target illegal traf-
ficking in infringing goods through customs processes.169 ACTA requires,
under each Party’s available laws, “enforcement procedures . . . to permit
effective action against any act of infringement of intellectual property
rights covered by this Agreement.”170 While commentators have detailed
criticisms of those measures specifically (especially border controls), this
section will focus on ACTA’s civil enforcement provisions.171
Under ACTA, “[e]ach Party shall make available to right holders civil
judicial procedures concerning the enforcement of any [IPR].”172 Among
those procedures are injunctions,173 damages,174 other remedies,175 and
the collection and preservation of evidence.176 These civil enforcement
provisions are not limited to first-party infringers. “Each Party shall pro-
vide that, in civil judicial proceedings concerning the enforcement of intel-
lectual property rights, its judicial authorities shall have the authority to
order against a party to desist from infringement an order to that party or
where appropriate to a third party over whom the relevant judicial author-
ity exercises jurisdiction . . . to prevent infringing goods from entering the
channels of commerce.”
ACTA represents a new restructuring of civil enforcement to increase
the rights of IP holders, with potentially deleterious effects on access to
medicines.177 For example, because ACTA requires that judicial authori-
168. Id. §§ 2–3.
169. Margot Kaminski, The Origins and Potential Impact of the Anti-Counterfeiting
Trade Agreement (ACTA), 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 247, 250 (2009).
170. ACTA, supra note 163, art. 6, ¶¶ 1, 2 (ACTA further requires these procedures be
“fair and equitable . . . and . . . not be unnecessarily complicated or costly, or entail unreason-
able time-limits or unwarranted delays”).
171. See Eddan Katz & Gwen Hinze, The Impact of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement on the Knowledge Ecomnomy: The Accountability of the Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative for the Creation of IP Enforcement Norms Through Executive Trade Agree-
ments, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 24, 24–25 (2009) (arguing that ACTA is overly broad and needs
“increased transparency, accountability mechanisms, and input from civil society”).
172. ACTA, supra note 163, art. 7, ¶ 1.
173. Id. art. 8, ¶ 1 (indicating that parties’ competent authorities have the power to
order a party to “desist from an infringement, and . . . prevent goods that involve the in-
fringement of an [IPR] from entering into the channels of commerce”).
174. Id. art. 9, ¶ 1 (noting that parties must provide “judicial authorities . . . the author-
ity to order the infringer . . . to compensate for the injury the [IPR] holder has suffered as a
result of the infringement”).
175. Id. art. 10, ¶¶ 1–2 (explaining that counterfeit goods, and all materials used in the
production of such goods, can be destroyed at the IPR holder’s request, and that ACTA
authorizes relevant parties to carry out the disposal/destruction of the goods at the infringer’s
expense).
176. Id. art. 11 (indicating that parties can seek to compel the release of information
pertaining to infringement situations).
177. See Sean Flynn, ACTA’s Constitutional Problem: The Treaty is Not a Treaty, 26
AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 903, 905, 911–12 (2012).
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ties have the power to issue injunctions against third parties, any interme-
diary provider of generic medicines to developing countries potentially
faces liability under the ACTA regime.178 According to Brook Baker
In the context of access to medicines, the concept “intermediary
services” may be quite ominous. Services are obviously provided
by ISPs - allowing supplier to market medicines online - and in the
pharmaceutical context, by shipping agents . . . . Perhaps more
ominously, many others who helped fund or facilitate purchases of
generic drugs, as they moved through the stream of international
commerce from producer to consumer could face intermediary li-
ability. For example, the Global Fund solicits and funds country-
led proposals for funding priority disease prevention, treatment,
and care.179
ACTA-compliant laws may enable foreign rights holders to target lo-
cal industries through threats or the use of litigation.180 The force of the
agreement extends beyond its power to shape domestic law, as it will inev-
itably also form the template for future bilateral agreements between
ACTA and non-ACTA states.181 The Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic
Partnership Agreement (“TPPA”) mimics many of ACTA’s IP provisions,
although its conclusion is more distant.182
C. Bilateral and Regional Trade and Investment Treaties
More common than broad, multilateral trade instruments like TRIPS
and ACTA, bilateral and regional investment and trade agreements con-
tain some of the strongest protections for intellectual property.183 Bilat-
eral investment treaties (“BITs”), for example, take a number of forms
and include provisions authorizing IP rights-holders to vindicate claims in
national or international courts or dispute resolution fora. Generally, BITs
are negotiated between developed and developing states.184 BITs contain
178. Cynthia M. Ho, Global Access to Medicine: The Influence of Competing Patent
Perspectives, 35 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1, 94–95 (2011).
179. Brook K. Baker, ACTA-Risks of Third-Party Enforcement for Access to Medicines,
26 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 579, 588–89 (2011).
180. See Yu, supra note 164, at 1036.
181. Id. at 1024 (referring to the “policy laundering” potential of ACTA).
182. Jane Kelsey, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement: A Gold-Plated Gift to the
Global Tobacco Industry? 39 AM. J.L. & MED. 237, 264 (2013) (“At the time of writing, it is
unclear if a final deal will be concluded.”). See Robert Stumberg, Safeguards for Tobacco
Control: Options for the TPPA, 39 AM. J.L. & MED. 382, 388–390 (2013).
183. U.N. Conf. on Trade & Dev. [UNCTAD], Intellectual Property Provisions in Inter-
national Investment Arrangements, 5, UNCTAD/WEB/ITE/IIA/2007/1 (2007) (“A sizable
proportion of these [investment] treaties include provisions obligating the contracting parties
to meet [intellectual-property] standards that are more stringent than the ones found in the
TRIPS Agreement.”).
184. Sam Foster Halabi, Efficient Contracting Between Foreign Investors and Host
States: Evidence from Stabilization Clauses, 31 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 261, 263 (2011) (dis-
cussing trends in bilateral investment treaty dyads).
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provisions guaranteeing investors from one state protections for their in-
vestments in the other state; these protections often define IP rights in
broad terms. These guarantees may include fair and equitable or non-dis-
criminatory treatment,185 free transfer of profits and currency, and, in
many cases, payment of compensation should a host state adopt measures
having the effect of direct or indirect expropriation.186 The origin and
number of BITs in existence is well-documented, although the reasons for
their proliferation remain in dispute.187 At the end of the 1980s, records at
the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development showed 385 BITs; a dec-
ade later, the number reached 1,857.188 Current estimates show approxi-
mately 3,000 BITs in force.189
BITs do not, typically, include enumerated rights for contracting states
outside their ability to prohibit certain economic activities altogether, ex-
empt certain economic sectors from the treaty’s applicability or to take
normal regulatory action in the interest of national security, public order,
public health or public morality—so-called “non-precluded measures.”190
Contracting states are still potentially obligated to compensate investors
for these “regulatory takings.” Public health exceptions, for example, are
often phrased in vague ways in the preamble, undermining their use as a
defense to an investor claim.191 Most of these treaties provide investors
access to one of the major international arbitral tribunals to vindicate
rights under a BIT.192
These treaties often give much stronger protection, with fewer stan-
dard exceptions, to intellectual property rights than international IP agree-
ments, TRIPS or domestic law.  For example, the Swiss-Uruguayan BIT
protects as investments “copyrights, industrial property rights (such as pat-
ents of inventions, utility models, industrial designs or models, trade or
185. Graham Mayeda, Playing Fair: The Meaning of Fair and Equitable Treatment in
Bilateral Investment Treaties, 41 J. WORLD TRADE 273, 273–74 (2007).
186. See, e.g., Agreement Between the Swiss Confederation and the Oriental Republic
of Uruguay Concerning the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Switz.-
Uru., art. 5, Oct. 7, 1988, 1976 U.N.T.S. 413 [hereinafter 1988 Swiss-Uruguayan BIT].
187. See Kojo Yelpaala, Fundamentalism in Public Health and Safety in Bilateral Invest-
ment Treaties [Part I], 3 ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 235, 236, 239 (2008).
188. UNCTAD, Bilateral Investment Treaties 1959–1999, at 1, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/
ITE/IIA/2 (2000).
189. Jose´ E. Alvarez, A Bit on Custom, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 17, 17 (2009).
190. See William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Investment Protection in Ex-
traordinary Times: The Interpretation and Application of Non-Precluded Measures Provisions
in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 307, 311–12 (2008).
191. See Julien Chaisse, Exploring the Confines of International Investment and Domes-
tic Health Protections—Is a General Exceptions Clause a Forced Perspective?, 39 AM. J.L. &
MED. 332, 341, 353 (2013).
192. Jason Webb Yackee, Pacta Sunt Servanda and State Promises to Foreign Investors
Before Bilateral Investment Treaties: Myth and Reality, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1550, 1554-55
(2009). Contra Christophe Dugue´, Dispute Resolution in International Project Finance Trans-
actions, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1064, 1072 (2001) (noting that international financiers often
prefer English or New York courts).
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service marks, trade names, indications of source or appellation of origin),
know-how and good-will” and requires the counterparty to compensate an
investor for “measures [taken directly or indirectly] of expropriation, na-
tionalization or any other measure having the same nature or the same
effect.”193   Under the 2012 U.S. Model BIT, an “‘investment’ means
every asset that an investor owns or controls, directly or indirectly . . .
includ[ing] . . . intellectual property rights.” IP rights are accorded similar
rights as though they were real property like land or a manufacturing facil-
ity, the traditional covered investments, although the U.S. Model BIT cre-
ates an explicit nexus between rights to compensation and measures
consistent with TRIPS.194
Indeed, if TRIPS represented the ceiling of substantive IP rights and
accompanying enforcement agreements, the entire debate on the balance
between TRIPS and public health might focus on flexibilities available in
the language of the agreement.195 But the flexibilities that WTO member
states might enjoy under TRIPS are narrowed, sometimes drastically, in
bilateral investment and trade treaties. For example, the U.S.-Jordan Free
Trade Agreement includes limitations on compulsory licenses and parallel
imports. The costliest TRIPS-plus terms are those that impose “data exclu-
sivity” separate from patent protection. Under “data exclusivity” regimes,
a generic drug manufacturer is not allowed to use clinical and safety trial
data from the initial drug application. This essentially requires the generics
applicant to undertake prohibitively expensive clinical trials, and imposes
on the government or end user the cost that generics theoretically exist to
save. As Oxfam indicates:
These expenditures have required that both public health system
and individuals pay higher prices for many new medicines that are
needed to treat serious non-communicable diseases (NCDs), such
as hypertension, asthma, diabetes, and mental illness. For exam-
ple, new medicines to treat diabetes and heart disease cost any-
where from two to six times more in Jordan than in Egypt, where
there are no TRIPS-plus barriers.196
Similar conflicts have arisen over alcohol, food and tobacco regula-
tion. When Uruguay introduced measures restricting the images, colors,
words and phrases that could appear on cigarette packages, Phillip Morris
International’s Swiss subsidiaries challenged the constitutionality of the
193. 1988 Swiss-Uruguayan BIT, supra note 186, arts 1, 5.
194. See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2012 U.S. MODEL BILATERAL
INVESTMENT TREATY, art.1 (2012), available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT%
20text%20for%20ACIEP%20Meeting.pdf.
195. See Lee Petherbridge, Intelligent TRIPS Implementation: A Strategy for Countries
on the Cusp of Development, 22 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 1029, 1047–48 (2001) (arguing for
the use of interpretative devices).
196. OXFAM INT’L, ALL COSTS, NO BENEFITS: HOW TRIPS-PLUS INTELLECTUAL PROP-
ERTY RULES IN THE US-JORDAN FTA AFFECT ACCESS TO MEDICINES 2 (2007), available at
http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/all%20costs,%20no%20benefits.pdf.
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regulations under Uruguayan law.197 PMI failed in the Uruguayan courts
before ultimately availing itself of a bilateral investment treaty between
Switzerland and Uruguay which not only gave PMI’s trademarks much
stronger protections than under either international trade or Uruguayan
law, but also placed significant limitations on the Uruguayan courts to
serve as the final authority on the dispute.198
III. CONFRONTATIONS BETWEEN IP RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC HEALTH LAW
As international public health law and international intellectual prop-
erty law have strengthened, so have the conflicts anticipated by each
movement’s advocates. Between 1994 and 2012, the conflict between in-
ternational intellectual property rights and international public health law
confronted parties to each of the major agreements outlined above and
foreshadowed conflicts that would arise during the negotiation of potential
agreements under instruments like the Medical Research and Innovation
Treaty, the Framework Convention on Alcohol Control and the Frame-
work Convention on Global Health. As the discussion of these episodes
shows, international public health law exercised little normative force over
strong intellectual property rights. Instead, international public health law
norms prevailed most often when sponsored by a strong middle income
states like Brazil, India, South Africa or Thailand.199
A. Guatemala, Brazil, India, the Philippines and the 1981 WHO Code
on the Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes
Guatemala represents precisely the kind of state for which the
1981 WHO Code on the Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes was
intended. Its “infant mortality rate is 55 per 1,000 live births and
the maternal mortality rate is 110 per 100,000 live births.”200 Also,
“approximately 16 percent of infants suffer from low birth weight,
and approximately 50 percent of all children are
malnourished.”201
197. Sam Foster Halabi, International Trademark Protection and Global Public Health:
A Just Compensation Regime for Expropriations and Regulatory Takings, 61 CATH. U. L.
REV. 321, 344–45 (2012).
198. See id. at 345, n.123.
199. See Daniel Benoliel & Bruno Salama, Towards an Intellectual Property Bargaining
Theory: The Post-WTO Era, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 265, 314-325  (2010); Paul Champ & Amir
Attaran, Patent Rights and Local Working under the WTO TRIPS Agreement: An Analysis of
the U.S.-Brazil Patent Dispute, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 365, 393 (2002).
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In 1983, Guatemala adopted Law 66-83, Law on the Protection of
Breastfeeding, which codified many aspects of the WHO International
Code, and in 1987 the Ministry of Health implemented the law through
Governmental Order No. 847-87. In 1992, Gerber applied to introduce a
new “step-by-step” product line in Guatemala and requested that the
products be registered with the Food & Drugs Registration and Control
Division, Guatemala’s equivalent of the United States’ FDA. The FDRC
required that Gerber remove its trademarked infant image, include a no-
tice that “breastmilk is the best for baby” as required under the law and
further specify the age of the child for which the products were intended.
Gerber pursued a three-prong strategy in response: asserting the prod-
ucts were “complementary” foods under Guatemalan law and therefore
not covered by 66-83 and 841-87; bringing a statutory action under U.S.
law to eliminate Guatemala’s trading preferences for effectively “national-
izing” its trademark; and threatening Guatemala’s compliance with (still
pending) TRIPS provisions. Gerber argued that:
Article 15 of [TRIPS] states that “The nature of the goods or ser-
vices to which a trademark is to be applied shall in no case form
an obstacle to registration of the trademark.” In addition, Article
20 of the proposed agreement provides in relevant part that “[t]he
use of a trademark in the course of trade shall not be unjustifiably
encumbered by special requirements, such as . . . use in a special
form or use in a manner detrimental to its capability to distinguish
the goods . . . .202
Applying a strained interpretation of “complementary foods,” the
Guatemalan Supreme Court of Justice determined that 66-83 and 841-87
applied only to locally prepared foods, not imported goods. Without ex-
plicitly acknowledging the role that the trade-based agreements played in
their construction of the law, “the case . . . shows . . . that raising the
spectre of the new WTO can be an effective pressure tool against small
countries that want to implement strong health regulations that may also
have negative impacts on commercial interests.”203
The Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines
successfully delayed and then earned relief from comprehensive labeling
restrictions through similar arguments, based in part on the trade-restric-
tive effect of warnings on formula containers.204
202. Letter from Mario Permuth to Gustavo Hernandez, Ministry of Pub. Health (Feb.
16, 1994) (on file with author) (“The Gerber Executive explained that they will fight with all
their strength for the application and enforcement of their industrial property rights in Gua-
temala and, at this moment, the major damages affecting them derive from the fact that they
have not been able to sell the [infant image-labeled] product in Guatemala.”).
203. BARBARA FIENIEG, THE POSITION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CODE ON BABYFOOD
MARKETING IN THE WTO 4 (2011), available at http://www.ibfan-alc.org/nuestro_trabajo/
archivo/codex/artwemos.pdf.
204. Rene Raya, The Philippine Breastfeeding Struggle Continues, 371 THE LANCET
794–95 (2008).
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Brazil, by contrast, fully incorporated the Code into law in 1988, em-
bedded subsequent WHA resolutions into administrative regulations, and
authorized third-party monitoring. Breastfeeding rates have risen steadily
as a result.205 Like Guatemala’s law, Brazil prohibited infant images on
breastmilk substitute packaging. When Gerber entered the Brazilian mar-
ket, it accepted the prohibition on its infant image. Similarly, in India,
where the Infant Milk Substitutes Act adopted a prohibition on images of
infants, women, or “phrases designed to increase the saleability of infant
milk substitutes or infant food,” exclusive breastfeeding at 4-5 months of
age is 46%, three times that of the Philippines.206
B. Brazil, India, South Africa, Thailand and Access to Medicines
Access to medicines was a principal concern of developing states dur-
ing the TRIPS negotiations. Many developing states considered the high
prices that accompanied patented medicines and their production
processes to frustrate their constitutional and international human rights
obligations to provide affordable health care to their citizens.
1. Compulsory Licenses and Parallel Imports
In addition to the generally worded provisions in Articles 7 and 8,
TRIPS also includes a compulsory licensing regime under which member
states may authorize third-party firms to manufacture patented products
or use patented processes.207 Article 31 obligates states to negotiate with
patent holders over the terms of these licenses unless they involve a “case
of a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency.”208
TRIPS does not explicitly address parallel import policies, which are used
to purchase patented drugs from a third state where a lower price is
charged.
Beginning with South Africa’s experience with parallel imports in
1997, Brazil, India, South Africa and Thailand have not only led the way in
using these alternatives to expand access to medicines for their own citi-
zens, but have also helped to obtain collective gains for developing coun-
tries generally. The confrontation between South Africa and Western
pharmaceutical firms, paralleled by Brazil’s compulsory license regime for
AIDS drugs, achieved at least two key victories. First, sponsoring govern-
ments withdrew opposition to compulsory licensing for HIV medications.
Second, the episodes prompted states to revisit the TRIPS agreement in
light of outbreaks and the reemergence of infectious diseases with dispro-
portionate effects in developing countries. The 2001 Doha Declaration on
205. See Marina Ferreira Rea, A Review of Breastfeeding in Brazil and How the Coun-
try Has Reached Ten Months’ Breastfeeding Duration, 19 CADERNOS DE SAU´DE PU´BLICA S37
(2003) (discussing––in Portuguese––Breastfeeding in Brazil).
206. The Infant Milk Substitutes, Feeding Bottles and Infant Foods (Regulation of Pro-
duction, Supply and Distribution) Act (IMS Act), Acts of Parliament, 1992 as Amended in
2003 (India), available at http://www.bpni.org/docments/IMS-act.pdf.
207. TRIPS, supra note 10, art. 31.
208. Id.
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the TRIPS Agreement on Public Health emphasized the importance of
compulsory licenses for HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other
epidemics and affirmed the freedom for states to establish their own re-
gimes for parallel imports.209 The final text was ultimately negotiated be-
tween the U.S. and Brazil, the former broadly representing states with
strong IP rights holding constituencies, the latter representing developing
countries pressing for wider access to affordable medications.210
In 2007, Thailand expanded the use of compulsory licenses beyond the
communicable diseases specified in the Doha Declaration, granting a com-
pulsory license for the heart disease medication marketed as Plavix. Thai-
land also issued compulsory licenses for four cancer drugs, the disease
burden of which is heavier than HIV/AIDS.211 Indeed, “[f]rom the Thai
government’s point of view, cancer ‘is no less serious than HIV/
AIDS.’”212 Similarly, in 2012 India granted a compulsory license for kid-
ney and liver cancer medications.213 Indeed, since 1995 “[m]ore than half
the compulsory licensing episodes occurred in upper-middle-income coun-
tries (including Brazil and Thailand).”214
These episodes might be equally construed as protecting powerful do-
mestic industries (e.g. India’s generics firms)215 rather than exhibiting any
form of solidarity these states feel with the plight of developing countries
facing large disease burdens.216 That is the point. It may not be norm crea-
209. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WT/
MIN(01)/DEC/2 (2002), available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/
mindecl_trips_e.htm.
210. Fisher & Raglioni, supra note 14, at 15.
211. TONI JOHNSON, THE DEBATE OVER GENERIC DRUG TRADE (2011), available at
http://www.cfr.org/drugs/debate-over-generic-drug-trade/p18055.  This is true more generally
in developing countries, and “[i]n 2008, approximately 72% of cancer deaths occurred in low
and middle income countries.” INT’L NETWORK FOR CANCER TREATMENT AND RESEARCH,
CANCER IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, http://www.inctr.org/about-inctr/cancer-in-developing-
countries/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2014).
212. Johnson, supra note 211.
213. Vikas Bajaj & Andrew Pollack, India Orders Bayer to License a Patented Drug,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/13/business/global/india-over-
rules-bayer-allowing-generic-drug.html?_r=0.
214. Read Beall & Randall Kuhn, Trends in Trends in Compulsory Licensing of
Pharmaceuticals Since the Doha Declaration: A Database Analysis (2012), available at http://
www.plosmedicine.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.1001154.
215. Elliott Hannon, How an Indian Patent Case Could Shape the Future of Generic
Drugs, TIME, Aug. 12, 2012, http://world.time.com/2012/08/21/how-an-indian-patent-case-
could-shape-the-future-of-generic-drugs/ (“India’s rising global presence is often associated
with its booming tech sector. But in many poor countries, India’s role is that of a low-cost
pharmacy. The country has become a leading supplier of affordable HIV/AIDS and Tubercu-
losis medications and is the second leading provider of medicines distributed by UNICEF in
the developing world.”).
216. See id.  (“The Indian patent law, however, set the bar much higher than in the U.S.
‘India has time and again really expressed a strong preference for public health concerns over
private patent rights,’ says Shamnad Basheer, a professor of intellectual property law at the
National University of Juridical Sciences in Calcutta.”). See also, E. Da Fonseca & S. Grus-
kin, Changing Global Essential Medicines Norms to Improve Access to AIDS Treatment: Les-
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tion or force flowing from the Doha Declaration that has resulted in com-
pulsory license activity, but rather the political and economic strength of
the licensing states that has allowed wider access to affordable medicine,
even as international intellectual property protections become stronger
and more widespread.
2. TRIPS Flexibilities and Model Laws
Compulsory licenses and parallel imports are relatively drastic actions
to narrow otherwise strong patent rights. But states also have a number of
other ways in which strong intellectual property rights called for in TRIPS
can be diminished. For example, states are under no obligation to allocate
greater resources to criminal enforcement of IP rights. If a state restricts
the use of its criminal prosecution priorities to non-IP matters, IP rights
holders must rely on the civil justice system to vindicate their rights. Al-
though, as noted above, this flexibility may not deter patent and trade-
mark holders in the areas most closely related to health.
States are also free to establish their own standards for patentability,
including novelty, non-obviousness and utility.217 For example, India
passed a patent protection statute that presumptively meets the minimum
requirements of TRIPS, granting 20-year exclusivity, for example, but de-
fining “novelty” and “efficacy” in ways that prevent firms from “evergree-
ning” their patents by filing patent applications with marginally different
applications or modalities from the protected patents.218 Novartis, which
had attempted to extend the patent on its cancer treatment drug Gleevec,
lost in India’s trial courts on even establishing the grounds for a new pat-
ent. India’s Intellectual Property Appellate Board (which had assumed ju-
risdiction over patents as a result of TRIPS) determined that it had in fact
met the basic requirements of patentability but failed scrutiny under a
more specific provision of India’s patent act, which erected a high barrier
for drug efficacy. The Supreme Court of India affirmed the IPAB’s deci-
sion that the patent failed India’s criteria for novelty.219
Section 3(d) of India’s Patent Act, which limits the possibility of ever-
greening patents, is in the process of being replicated in the Philippines,
sons from Brazil, 4 GLOBAL PUB. HEALTH 131, 140 (2009); Kelley Lee, Luiz Carlos Chagas &
Thomas E. Novotny, Brazil and the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control: Global
Health diplomacy as Soft Power, 7 PLOS MEDICINE 1, 1 (2010).
217. See Kevin W. McCabe, The January 1999 Review of Article 27 of the TRIPS Agree-
ment: Diverging Views of Developed and Developing Countries Toward the Patentability of
Biotechnology, 6 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 41, 61 (1998) (explaining the technology gap disfavoring
the production of biotechnology inventions in developing countries).
218. See UNCTAD, Using Intellectual Property Rights to Stimulate Pharmaceutical
Production in Developing Countries: A Reference Guide, 14, UNCTAD/DIAE/PCB/2009/19
(2011), available at http://unctad.org/en/Docs/diaepcb2009d19_en.pdf.
219. Novartis AG v. Union of India & Others, Unreported Judgment (2013), 96, availa-
ble at http://supremecourtofindia.nic.in/outtoday/patent.pdf (holding that “the appeals filed
by Novartis AG fail and are dismissed with cost”); Editorial, India’s Novartis Decision, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 4, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/05/opinion/the-supreme-court-in-india-
clarifies-law-in-novartis-decision.html?_r=0.
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while other developing nations are also likely to use that section as a
model.220 Furthermore, Brazil’s compulsory licensing scheme for AIDS
drugs has served as model for other Latin American jurisdictions.221 In
addition, Brazil used its economic power to negotiate bargains on behalf
of Latin American governments seeking lower prices for medicines.222
3. Action at the World Trade Organization
In 2008 and 2009, Dutch customs authorities seized at least 19 ship-
ments of generic drugs transiting through the Netherlands, 16 of which
came from India.223 Brazil and India initiated proceedings at the World
Trade Organization to challenge the Dutch and European laws under
which the seizures were authorized. The states secured a promise from the
E.U. in July 2011 to end the seizures, but Dutch authorities seized another
29 cartons of medicine in December 2012 and E.U. negotiators have
balked at specifically addressing the border seizures in ongoing negotia-
tions over an E.U.-India Free Trade Agreement.224 While Brazil and In-
dian complaints are technically in abeyance as long as the E.U. abides by
its agreement, they challenge a wide range of current IP practices in devel-
oped states. While larger markets like Brazil, India and Thailand have
managed to withstand pressure to include IP-rights strengthening provi-
sions in investment and trade agreements as well as use the international
trading system to expand access to medicines, smaller markets, often
where the diseases impose higher morbidity and mortality, are buckling
under pressure from more powerful countries.
C. Indonesia and the International Health Regulations
The International Health Regulations depend on a number of identifi-
cation, communication and treatment mechanisms to address potential
220. Soma Das, Indian Patent Law Will be Emulated by Many Nations: S Chandrase-
karan, THE ECONOMIC TIMES, Apr. 3, 2013, available at http://articles.economictimes.india
times.com/2013-04-03/news/38248787_1_glivec-patent-case-patent-office-product-patent.
221. See Ellen F.M. ‘T Hoen, TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents and Access to Essential
Medicines: Seattle, Doha and Beyond, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 27, 32 (2002).
222. Susan Okie, Fighting HIV—Lessons from Brazil, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1977
(2006) (indicating that “Brazil’s economic clout helped to push through a landmark agree-
ment between the governments of 11 Latin American countries and 26 drug companies to
lower the cost of . . . drugs”).
223. Moˆnica Steffen, Guise Rosina & Lea Shaver, Why Are Generic Drugs Being Held
Up in Transit? Intellectual Property Rights, International Trade, and the Right to Health in
Brazil and Beyond, 40 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 197, 201 (2012).
224. Joe C. Mathew, Dutch Customs Seize Indian Drugs in Transit, Industry Frets, BUSI-
NESS STANDARD, Jan. 3, 2012, available at http://www.business-standard.com/article/
companies/dutch-customs-seize-indian-drugs-in-transit-industry-frets-112012300081_1.html.
See Brook Baker, Settlement of India/EU WTO Dispute re Seizures of In-Transit Medicines:
Why the Proposed EU Border Regulation Isn’t Good Enough 2 (PIJIP, Research Paper No.
2012-02, 2012), available at http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1026&context=research; Jayati Ghose, India wants EU to stop seizure of generic
drugs, THE FINANCIAL EXPRESS, May 3, 2013, available at http://www.financialexpress.com/
news/india-wants-eu-to-stop-seizure-of-generic-drugs/1110796.
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pandemics. Vaccines, for example, are one of the most important lines of
defense against the emergence of pandemics.225 The development and dis-
tribution of vaccines is dependent on patents on “genetic sequences or
proteins of the pandemic virus, as well as on novel methods for vaccine
production, [and] the actual vaccine,” in addition to chemicals which maxi-
mize the number of doses available from a given antigen or virus.226
Strong patent protections pose at least two related threats to the func-
tionality of the IHR with respect to preventing and controlling epidemics.
First, only a few companies have the infrastructure and technology for vac-
cine development, and these companies are largely located in developed
countries.227 This concentration renders developing states potentially de-
pendent on wealthier states to manufacture and distribute vaccines in suf-
ficient quantities to address their needs in the case of disease outbreaks.
Second, the origin of outbreaks, especially influenza, is often in developing
states like China, Indonesia and the Middle East. These states must there-
fore be willing to share disease samples and biological material relevant to
risk assessment, risk management, disease research and vaccine develop-
ment. When firms patent shared samples, vaccines become unaffordable
and the willingness to share is undermined.228
In 2006, Indonesia withheld H5N1 avian flu samples from WHO, un-
dermining efforts to monitor and produce vaccines in response to an avian
flu outbreak that rapidly spread worldwide.229 Indonesia asserted that its
decision was a response to an Australian company’s development of a vac-
cine derived from a virus sample Indonesia provided to WHO.230 The cy-
cle demonstrated the inequities inherent in the global disease surveillance
system established by the IHR. As David Fidler observed:
Developing countries provided information and virus samples to
the WHO-operated system; pharmaceutical companies in industri-
alized countries then obtained free access to such samples, ex-
ploited them, and patented the resulting products, which the
developing countries could not afford.231
225. See Eileen M. Kane, Achieving Clinical Equality in an Influenza Pandemic: Patent
Realities, 39 SETON HALL L. REV. 1137, 1146 (2009).
226. Id. at 1137, 1158 (“For example, the use of non-viral chemicals that augment the
immunogenicity of a vaccine - known as adjuvants - is critical.  Such compounds allow a
vaccine to include less actual antigen or virus, and thus allow for dose-sparing clinical ap-
proaches that maximize the utility of the available viral components.”).
227. See id. at 1148 n.62 (explaining that only a few companies can supply the market
with vaccines, and providing a link to an FDA website that lists the companies, all of which
are located in North America or the United Kingdom).
228. See id. at 1153 n.95 (citing to a GISAID source that explains that patents create
barriers and that scientists need to be able to share virus specimens if they want to develop
vaccines quickly.
229. David P. Fidler, Influenza Virus Samples, International Law, and Global Health
Diplomacy, 14 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASE J. 88, 88 (2008).
230. Id.
231. Id.
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Participation by Indonesia is in many ways crucial to the global sur-
veillance system. He continues: “[w]ithout access to Indonesia’s influenza
strains, global surveillance was jeopardized, as was the refinement of diag-
nostic reagents and the development of intervention strategies, which de-
pend on the information surveillance provides.”232
In 2009, the outbreak of H1N1 influenza in Mexico demonstrated not
only that the global surveillance system benefited Western pharmaceutical
firms, but also that in the case of a real pandemic, those firms’ sponsoring
governments could not be relied upon to equitably share vaccines:
Canada awarded its vaccine contract to a Canadian company be-
cause it feared that foreign governments might restrict exports to
Canada because of vaccine shortages within their territories. The
Australian government made it clear to the Australian manufac-
turer CSL that it must fulfill the government’s domestic needs
before exporting vaccine to the United States. The United States
pledged on September 17, 2009, to donate 10% of its vaccine
purchases to WHO, but on October 28, US Secretary of Health
and Human Services Kathleen Sebelius stated that the United
States would not donate H1N1 vaccine as promised until all at-
risk Americans had access, because production problems had cre-
ated shortages in the United States.233
Despite clear acknowledgment that the 2009 outbreak originated in
Mexico and leveled its most significant toll there, Mexico “‘had a terrifi-
cally difficult time getting access to the pandemic vaccine.’”234
As a result of these episodes, developing countries led by Indonesia
pressed both WHO and developed states to conclude an agreement on
equitable access to pandemic vaccines. In 2011, the WHO Open-Ended
Working Group of Member States on Pandemic Influenza Preparedness
(“PIP”) finalized an agreement in which developing countries agreed to
routinely share mutating flu virus samples in exchange for options to re-
serve antiviral medications, real time vaccine production, and/or IP li-
censes as well as monetary support commitments from vaccine
manufacturers. Even at that, the PIP framework was adopted under
WHO’s Article 23 recommendatory power, not its Article 19 treaty power
1or its Article 21 regulation-issuing authority. Moreover, the Standard
232. Id.
233. David P. Fidler, Negotiating Equitable Access to Influenza Vaccines: Global Health
Diplomacy and the Controversies Surrounding Avian Influenza H5N1 and Pandemic Influ-
enza H1NI, 7 PLOS MEDICINE 1, 2 (2010), available at http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/
info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.1000247.
234. Richard Knox, WHO Resolves Impasse Over Sharing of Flu Viruses, Access to
Medicines, NPR, Apr. 18, 2011, http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2011/04/18/135519592/who-
resolves-impasse-over-sharing-of-flu-viruses-access-to-vaccines.
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Material Transfer Agreements appended to it are largely deferential to the
patent interests of manufacturers.235
D. Australia, Uruguay and the FCTC
As with the International Code and the IHR, the WHO’s Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control engenders confrontations with intellec-
tual property rights, primarily trademarks. At least three of the FCTC to-
bacco-demand reduction provisions involve or potentially involve conflicts
with trademarks, especially on packaging and labeling.236 Indeed, the vis-
ual imagery fundamentally tied to trademarks represents a chief invest-
ment by tobacco firms, which use visual and written cues to prompt and
manipulate demand for tobacco products.237 Tobacco firms not only intro-
duced “light,” “mild” and “ultra-light” in their brands to suggest to con-
sumers that “light” versions of cigarettes were safer, they adapted label
and packaging color schemes to convey that message; for example,
“White-and-gold Marlboro Lights will still suggest “lightness” just by the
stark contrast to the red, full-strength Marlboros. The powder-blue Camel
Lights with their pastel camel will still look milder than the ornery desert-
ocher animal on the regular ‘Filters’ pack.”238
To combat the potential misleading effects of cigarette packaging,
Uruguay implemented a number of FCTC-compliant tobacco control mea-
sures between 2008 and 2010, including two which addressed the manipu-
lation of packaging and labeling to shape health perceptions of tobacco
products. First, the state required that pictorial warnings cover eighty per-
cent of a cigarette pack’s surface. Second, Ministry of Health limited the
sale of cigarettes to only one variety per brand, the so-called single presen-
tation requirement.239 This part of the law prevents a firm from selling
multiple varieties of cigarette under a single trademark. For example,
Philip Morris International (“PMI”), whose most important asset is the
Marlboro brand, could no longer sell Marlboro “Reds,” Marlboro
“Greens,” and Marlboro “Blues,” which leaves “Marlboros” as its only
authorized variety (although it owns or licenses other brands in the Uru-
235. Sangeeta Shashikant, Milestone Virus/Benefit-Sharing Agreement with Shortcom-
ings, GLOBAL HEALTH WATCH, May 6, 2011, available at www.ghwatch.org/sites/www.gh
watch.org/files/PIP_sangeeta.doc.
236. See WHO FCTC, supra note 82, arts. 10, 11, 13.
237. See E.C. Etzel et al., Camel Filter Revised Packaging Test 5 (1979), available at
http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/qxb79d00/pdf;jsessionid=43FC007572C9433D52CB1F927137
F593.tobacco03 (describing the marketing rationales for changing packaging designs and col-
ors); Melanie Wakefield et al., The Cigarette Pack as Image: New Evidence from Tobacco
Industry Documents, 11 Tobacco Control i73, i77 (2002) (discussing marketing tactics, like
segmentation analysis, which is used by tobacco companies).
238. Geoff Winestock, ‘Light’ Tobacco Ads Found Deceptive, European Parliament to
Vote on Ban, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 2000, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB972586093
339181226.
239. Ministry of Public Health Ordinance No. 514 (Aug. 18, 2008) (Uruguay), available
at http://www.tobaccocontrollaws.org/files/live/Uruguay/Uruguay%20-%20Ordinance
%20No.%20514.pdf.
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guayan market).240 PMI first challenged the regulations in Uruguayan
courts, seeking an injunction based in part on Uruguay’s revised, TRIPS-
compliant trademark law. Unsuccessful in Uruguayan courts, PMI initi-
ated (through entities it controlled) arbitration proceedings under Switzer-
land’s BIT with Uruguay. That treaty included not only broad definitions
of “investor” and “investment,” but also established narrow and toothless
exceptions for public health regulations and required even laws passed
with assurance of due process to compensate an investor for an “indirect”
expropriation.241 Despite the regulations falling squarely within the mea-
sures recommended by the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control
(especially the Article 11 guidelines), the Uruguayan government vacil-
lated on withdrawing or moderating the measures until strong financial
and political support emerged from the Bloomberg Family Foundation,
the World Health Organization and hundreds of public health NGOs.242
Even before the FCTC, firms effectively used international trademark
law to undermine strong tobacco control measures. In 1992, Australian
legislators considered imposing a “plain packaging” regime on cigarette
manufacturers.243 This requirement provided that only the manufacturer’s
name could appear in standardized black font, and that the remainder of
240. FTR Holding S.A. v. Uruguay, ICSID Case No. APRB/10/17, Request for Arbitra-
tion, ¶¶ 45, 89 (Feb. 19, 2011) available at http://www.smoke-free.ca/eng_home/2010/PMIvs
Uruguay/PMI-Uruguay%20complaint0001.pdf (“As of 31 December 2009, Article 3 of Ordi-
nance 514 has resulted in an approximately 15 per cent decrease in Abal’s sales.  The hardest
hit brand has been ‘Marlboro,’ of which the discontinued ‘Marlboro Gold,’ ‘Marlboro Blue’
and ‘Marlboro Green (Fresh Mint)’ varieties represented 40.5 per cent of total sales in
2008. . . . It should be noted that Philip Morris affiliates worldwide have invested significant
amounts of time and money in developing a revision of the three sub-brands of the Marlboro
family.  As a result of Ordinance 514, Philip Morris has been prevented from introducing
these innovations in Uruguay and accordingly has been deprived of the use of its intellectual
property.”).
241. See 1988 Swiss-Uruguayan BIT, supra note 186, arts. 1, 5.
242. Beginning in 2005, under the leadership of Dr. Tabare´ Vazquez––an oncologist by
training––Uruguay aggressively implemented indoor smoking bans, harsher pack warnings
and tax hikes in order to reduce Uruguay’s high levels of tobacco consumption and exposure
to tobacco smoke.  Smoking prevalence and related illnesses declined under the Vazquez
regime. See Ministry of Public Health Decree No. 284/008 on Regulations Under Law No.
18.256 (Uruguay), available at http://www.tobaccocontrollaws.org/files/live/Uruguay/Uruguay
%20-%20Decree%20No.%20284_008.pdf; Adriana Blanco-Marquizo et al., Reduction of
Secondhand Tobacco Smoke in Public Places Following National Smoke-free Legislation in
Uruguay, 19 TOBACCO CONTROL 231, 231 (2010), http://www.researchgate.net/publication/
44629407_Reduction_of_secondhand_tobacco_smoke_in_public_places_following_national_
smoke-free_legislation_in_Uruguay/file/9fcfd5060622fe6e9c.pdf; Bloomberg Supports Uru-
guay’s Tobacco Fight, NAT’L J., Nov. 16, 2010, available at http://www.nationaljournal.com/
bloomberg-supports-uruguay-s-tobacco-fight-20101116. See also Press Release, Centers for
Disease Control, Statement Regarding First Release of Global Adult Tobacco Survey Results
by Uruguay (Feb. 9, 2010), available at http://www.cdc.gov/media/pressrel/2010/s100209.htm.
PMI’s suit coincided with his exit from office and his successor vacillated between maintain-
ing Uruguay’s strong laws and relaxing them in order to placate PMI and avoid costly litiga-
tion with a substantial risk that an international arbitration panel might issue a large award to
PMI.
243. See Halabi, supra note 197, at 362.
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the package must remain an entirely uniform color, except for govern-
ment-mandated health warnings.244 British American Tobacco argued
before the Australian Senate that the Paris Convention for the Protection
of Industrial Property and Australian law would require compensation for
the value of its cigarette brands.245 The Australian government rejected
the proposed regulations.246 The Ministry of Health announced that
“[u]nfortunately, [the proposal] is just not feasible. . . . We would have to
buy the tobacco companies’ trademarks, and that would cost us hundreds
of millions of dollars.”247 Australia revived its plain packaging plan in 2011
and the government prevailed in the High Court of Australia in 2012. In
2011, PMI initiated arbitration proceedings (again through a wholly-
owned entity) against Australia under a BIT in effect between itself and
Hong Kong.248 Ukraine quickly requested consultations and the establish-
ment of a dispute settlement panel under the auspices of the WTO, at-
tracting the attention of dozens of states interested in whether or not
Australia’s plain packaging regime is consistent with TRIPS, the TBT
Agreement and/or GATT.249
E. Thailand and Pictorial Warnings on Alcoholic Beverage Containers
In January 2010, Thailand proposed legislation requiring that graphic
warning labels cover thirty percent of the surface of beer, wine and spirits
containers.250 The subsequent response by international alcoholic bever-
age firms and their supporting governments mirrors the conflict between
strong tobacco packaging and labeling regulations and international intel-
lectual property claims. The minutes from the meeting of the Committee
on non-Tariff Barriers to trade notes:
The US representative noted that Clause 3 of the draft regulation
precluded US labels from having: “any word or statement that
misleads consumers to understand that alcoholic beverages are
safe and good for health or contain lower level of harmful sub-
stances compared with other alcoholic beverages or contains
244. See Garfield Mahood, WHO, Canada’s Tobacco Package Label or Warning Sys-
tem: “Telling the Truth” About Tobacco Product Risks 7 (2003).
245. See SUBMISSION ON TOBACCO GROWING, supra note 11, at 3.
246. Adam Harvey, Doctors’ Plan to Put Cigarettes in Plain Wrap Fails, SYDNEY MORN-
ING HERALD, July 24, 1995 (quoting the spokeswoman for the Ministry of Health).
247. Id.
248. BLOOMBERG NEWS, Philip Morris Sues Australia Over Cigarette Packaging, N.Y.
TIMES, June 26, 2011.
249. Australia—Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks and Other Plain Packaging
Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds434_e.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2014).
250. Patrick Barta & Christina Passariello, Global Liquor Makers Fight Graphic Labels
in Thailand, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424
052748704392104575475513718846130; COMMITTEE ON TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE,
Notification, G/TBT/N/THA/332, at 2 (Jan 21, 2010), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/
imrd/directdoc.asp?DDFDocuments/t/G/tbtn10/THA332.doc.
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words or statements that directly or indirectly advertise the alco-
holic beverage”. . . . to the extent that a registered trademark con-
tained any such description, this vague provision could result in
trademarks being prohibited on alcoholic beverage packaging.251
Argentina, Australia, Chile, Mexico, the EU, New Zealand, and Swit-
zerland also raised either intellectual property or trade barrier challenges
to the proposed regulations.252 In his analysis of alcohol manufacturers’
participation in trade and investment treaties, Dr. Donald Zeigler ob-
serves parallels between the tobacco companies’ intellectual property
claims and those that alcohol manufacturers advocate in trade and invest-
ment instruments.253
IV. INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC HEALTH LAW IN A WORLD OF
STRONG INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
It is certainly true that international intellectual property protections
do not completely preclude international public health law’s potential
gains. For example, IP protections pose no obvious barriers to preventing
the distribution of free infant formula samples to health care workers, nor
to the adoption of prohibitions on smoking in public places. Moreover,
there are inchoate efforts in discrete areas of international public health
law that are generally unrelated to IP rights, like the international recruit-
ment of health workers.254 Yet, broadly speaking, the potential gains from
existing international public health law instruments and those on the hori-
zon are fundamentally tied to the subordination of the wide powers intel-
lectual property holders now hold. In spite of the episodes described
above, the central significance of international intellectual property pro-
tection to the development of international public health law appears curi-
ously askew of global health advocates’ primary agenda.
Article 15 of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, for ex-
ample, calls for the elimination of all forms of illicit trade in tobacco prod-
ucts, of which counterfeit cigarettes are an integral part. When the parties
negotiated a separate treaty to give effect to that provision, the Protocol to
Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products, they agreed in Article 2 that
“[n]othing in this Protocol shall affect the rights and obligations of any
Party pursuant to any other international convention, treaty or interna-
251. Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, Minutes of the Meeting of 24-25 March
2010, G/TBT/M/50, ¶ 10 (Mar. 24-25, 2010), available at http://www.smoke-free.ca/trade-and-
tobacco/wto-secretariat/TBT50_28mai10.pdf.
252. See Barta & Passariello, supra note 250; Tobacco and Alcohol Technical Barriers
Among Members’ Trade Concerns, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Mar. 24–25, 2010), http://www.
wto.org/english/news_e/news10_e/tbt_24mar10_e.htm.
253. Donald W. Zeigler, The Alcohol Industry and Trade Agreements: A Preliminary
Assessment, 104 ADDICTION 13, 20–21 (2009).
254. See e.g., WHO, GLOBAL CODE OF PRACTICE ON THE INTERNATIONAL RECRUIT-
MENT OF HEALTH PERSONNEL (2010), available at http://www.who.int/hrh/migration/code/
practice/en/.
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tional agreement in force for that Party that it deems to be more condu-
cive to the achievement of the elimination of illicit trade in tobacco
products.”255 In short, any agreement that gives strong protection to to-
bacco trademarks, which are always asserted as a defense against the
counterfeit cigarette trade, is fully compatible with the Protocol.256
Similarly, at the same time the WHO is attempting to conclude a Med-
ical Research and Innovation Treaty, it is also undertaking greater efforts
toward fostering collaboration on counterfeit medicines and devices, i.e.,
unsafe, unregulated, or fraudulently labeled or represented drugs which
pose risks of illness, injury or death to patients. There are of course nu-
merous ways to define “counterfeit” drugs, including a definition that em-
phasizes the infringement of protected trademarks under TRIPS,257 but
also one that focuses on the effects of counterfeits on patients, in which IP
rights are less implicated.258 Notwithstanding key policy flexibilities at-
tached to definitional choices, the World Health Assembly has decided to
study the public health effects of counterfeit medicines “excluding trade
and intellectual property considerations,” a determination which will inev-
itably influence the outcome of any international agreement on the
issue.259
Those calling for a Framework Convention on Alcohol Control have
argued rather loosely that it should be another version of the FCTC, and
have advanced few if any provisions which might address the IP challenges
the FCTC has faced. The WHO’s Global Strategy to Reduce the Harmful
Use of Alcohol acknowledges the role of marketing in influencing con-
sumption but does not address the role of trademark law in obstructing
recommended measures. The Framework Convention on Global Health
has gone even further, suggesting that “an FCGH could require states and
international organizations to show that loan conditions or trade rules are
255. Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products, art. 2(3), opened for signa-
ture Jan. 10, 2013, available at http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/80873/1/9789241505246
_eng.pdf?ua=1.
256. The word “counterfeit” was removed from the Protocol text for this reason, but its
absence does not affect the strength of Article 2. See Tania Voon, Growing Conflicts Between
Intellectual Property Rights and Health, 2 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. (forthcoming), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2280183&download=yes.
257. Gian Luca Burci, Public Health and “Counterfeit” Medicines: The Role of the
World Health Organization, 17 ASIL INSIGHTS (2013), available at http://www.asil.org/in
sights/volume/17/issue/2/public-health-and-%E2%80%9Ccounterfeit%E2%80%9D-
medicines-role-world-health-organization.
258. See, e.g., Jonathan Liberman, Combating Counterfeit Medicines and Illicit Trade in
Tobacco Products: Minefields in Global Health Governance, 40 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 326,
329–30 (2012).
259. WHO, WHA Res. WHA63(10), (May 21, 2010), available at http://apps.who.int/gb/
or/e/e_wha63r1.html.
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not detrimental to the public’s health.”260 But the FCGH still avoids the
detailed international IP protections that would jeopardize its mission.261
A. Rescission of Existing Bilateral, Regional and Multilateral
Intellectual Property Agreements
Whatever the promise of health diplomacy, it does not appear that
“health” is overcoming the traditional concerns of “diplomacy.” Implausi-
ble proposals call for the elimination of international IP agreements alto-
gether to solve this problem. Some, like Kojo Yelpalla, would simply
throw entire agreements like TRIPS out:
Before TRIPS, over forty countries offered no patent protection
for pharmaceutical inventions. Such sovereign authority of states
has been compromised by TRIPS as part of the WTO system of
agreements. . . . This exploitation of the inequalities of bargaining
power was undertaken at a time when many developing countries
were ill equipped or unprepared to appreciate all the implications
of TRIPS. Nor did they fully understand the significance of the
converging forces at work. In riding the tidal wave of these forces,
the developed countries did not merely succeed in linking the
right to trade to the protection of intellectual property rights; they
also succeeded in setting up a structure whereby, under interna-
tional law, foreign private interests could subvert the political au-
thority and public interest of the state. . . . It is now widely
acknowledged by most observers that TRIPS is a serious threat to
human health security.262
Even scholars less hostile to the underlying purpose of the agreement
concede that the built-in flexibilities of TRIPS263 may not help much
against determined IP-rights holders with the heaviest investments in
knowledge-intensive processes or assets.264 Yet it is certainly true that in
response to developments in international investment and trade law, some
states are revising or withdrawing from agreements with strong intellectual
property protections.265
260. Lawrence O. Gostin, A Framework Convention on Global Health: Health for All,
Justice for All, 307 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2087, 2091 (2012), available at http://jama.jamanetwork
.com/article.aspx?articleid=1157495.
261. Id.
262. Yelpaala, supra note 125, at 61–66.
263. Id. at 61 n.38.
264. Brewster, supra note 144, at 32.
265. Mercedes Alvaro, Ecuador Plans to Audit Bilateral Investment Treaties, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 11, 2013, ; Int’l Inst. for Sustainable Dev., South Africa Begins Withdrawing from
EU-Member BITs, INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS, Oct. 30, 2012, http://www.iisd.org/itn/2012/
10/30/news-in-brief-9/.
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B. Revision of Existing Bilateral, Regional and Multilateral
Intellectual Property Agreements
Other, more pragmatic, solutions require working within existing in-
ternational IP agreement frameworks. Bilateral, regional and international
IP treaties, for example, do not need to afford IP holders an entire admin-
istrative and judicial framework that may, and often does, exaggerate the
benefits those goods offer. Firms, for example, have shown themselves
able to punish governments who threaten their intellectual property in-
vestments.266 Other solutions involve explicit limitations on the adjudica-
tory rights private parties enjoy under bilateral or multilateral
instruments.267 This is, in effect, the aim of the Doha Declaration, which
emphasizes the rights of governments to facilitate access to medicines for
their citizens, as well as more modern trends in bilateral investment trea-
ties.268 The United States, for example, has determined that investment
agreements should not provide foreign investors with greater substantive
protections than domestic investors.269 Australia has recently moved away
from investor-state dispute resolutions in its investment agreements.270
Other possibilities include concrete exceptions for public health measures
and the exemption of IP and related rights from bilateral agreements.
Another strategy is to explicitly address international intellectual
property rights in international public health agreements themselves.
WHO Article 19 treaties, like the FCTC and its Illicit Trade Protocol, Ar-
ticle 21 measures like the IHR, and even Article 23 recommendations like
the International Code frankly depend on the curtailment or at least con-
textualization of IP rights to succeed. Ignoring or downplaying the impor-
tance of IP rights leaves large gaps in the potential coverage offered by
international public health law. To phrase it another way, international
public health law to a significant extent is intellectual property law. To be
266. After Thailand issued a compulsory license for Abbott Laboratories’ HIV drug
Kaletra, Abbott canceled plans to sell seven new medicines in Thailand and threatened to
end its drug registration activities altogether.  One of these medicines was a heat-stable form
of Kaletra that required no refrigeration.  See Andrew Jack & Amy Kazmin, Abbott Pulls
HIV Drug in Thai Patents Protest, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2007, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a2e
81cc8-d1d1-11db-b921-000b5df10621.html#axzz2zrJWd3KK.  In Uruguay, Philip Morris In-
ternational closed a tobacco processing plant in retaliation for the government’s anti-tobacco
measures.  See Felipe Llambias, Philip Morris Says Closes Plant in Uruguay Amid Lawsuit,
REUTERS, Oct. 21, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/22/philipmorris-uruguay-id
USN1E79K1YZ20111022.
267. Daniela Caruso, Private Law and State-Making in the Age of Globalization, 39
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 63–64 (2006).
268. Thomas A. Haag, TRIPS Since Doha: How far Will the WTO Go Toward Modify-
ing the Terms of Compulsory Licensing?, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y, 945, 955–66
(2002) (discussing the requirements for triggering the use of Article 31(k)).
269. Trade Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-210, § 2102(b)(3) (2002).
270. DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE, Gillard Government Trade Pol-
icy Statement: Trading Our Way to More Jobs and Prosperity 14 (2011), available at http://
www.acci.asn.au/getattachment/b9d3cfae-fc0c-4c2a-a3df-3f58228daf6d/Gillard-Government-
Trade-Policy-Statement.aspx.
768 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 35:715
sure, IP issues often permeate negotiations over international public
health law instruments. Negotiators successfully included “trademark” as
a subject of FCTC Article 11’s prohibition on misleading descriptors over
the objection of states with strong trademark-rights holding constituen-
cies.271 But the examples described above, including the Illicit Trade Pro-
tocol, the Framework Convention on Alcohol Control and the Framework
Convention on Global Health demonstrate the general reluctance of pub-
lic health stakeholders to specifically address management of IP rights as
part of broader international public health law initiatives.
This is unsustainable even for public-private partnerships, which gen-
erally operate well within the boundaries of international intellectual
property protection. The Global Fund’s activities, for example, may fall
afoul of ACTA.272 The GAVI Alliance’s model of Advanced Market
Commitment institutionalizes the fundamental difficulty IP rights pose:
because the AMCs are so expensive and technically detailed, they both
limit the amount of vaccines that can be purchased and threaten to crowd
out lower-cost manufacturers.273
Strategies incorporating IP law into the global public health frame-
work do not necessarily need to sharply limit or manage IP rights in the
text of agreements. However, they must at least address the fundamental
threat that enforceable IP rights in international agreements pose to public
health interventions. These threats, of course, vary in their severity. For
patents, for example, there is an identifiable point of protection at which
original innovation is encouraged and therefore welfare-enhancing. Past
that point, the patent monopoly threatens accompanying innovations,
which may result in higher-quality products or processes or means by
which those products or processes might be less expensively distributed.
For trademarks, especially alcohol, beverage, food and tobacco trade-
marks, rights-holders spend vast amounts learning which shapes, colors,
figures and other visual cues will enhance consumption. This leads to con-
sumption well beyond any limit set by evidence-based nutrition policy or
even the limited purpose trademarks are meant to serve: distinguishing
competitors’ products or services.274
For example, it makes sense to impose liability upon tobacco manufac-
turers with respect to the costs deceptive trademarks impose on society
and the heavy investments they make in shaping the perception of their
products’ risks. That liability may be imposed without violating trade-
271. SEAN D. MURPHY, UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: 2002-2004
147 (2005).
272. The possibility is not far-fetched.  One of the generic drugs shipments seized in the
Netherlands in 2009 was purchased by UNITAID and moving from India to Nigeria, where
none of the drugs were patent-protected. See Steffan, Rosina & Shaver, supra note 223, at
200-01.
273. See Donald W. Light, Saving the Pneumococcal AMC and GAVI, 7 HUM. VAC-
CINES 138, 139 (2011), available at http://www.landesbioscience.com/journals/vaccines/News-
HV7-2-policy.pdf.
274. See Halabi, supra note 197, at 365.
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mark-protective terms in TRIPS and many bilateral investment treaties.
This was originally possible under early versions of Article 19 of the
FCTC, although the scope of such liability was eventually narrowed. The
same would be true, to varying extents, for alcohol and food manufactur-
ers. Together, these three industries account for a significant part of the
disease burden that international public health law aims to address.
The Medical Research and Innovation Treaty, to date, represents the
approach most likely to harmonize international intellectual property law
and international public health law in ways respectful of both. The treaty
creates a regime under which specific drug and medical device develop-
ment will occur in a space “where the current [international intellectual
property] system does not function.” The compromises involved will no
doubt disappoint both strong IP-rights advocates and public health advo-
cates, but explicitly balancing the costs and benefits of each in an open
forum increases the chance that an equitable conclusion will be reached.
Indeed, the treaty, once considered dead letter, was revived during the
2013 meeting of the World Health Assembly when the United States pro-
posed a series of demonstration projects that might bridge the current,
deep divides between member states over the treaty’s terms.275
C. The Role of Multipolarity in Rebalancing International Intellectual
Property Protections and International Public Health Law
Addressing intellectual property challenges in public health treaties
inevitably means protracted negotiations and perhaps fewer agreements.
On the one hand, this might mean advocacy resources are allocated to
more effective uses. If the allocation of scarce resources requires a choice,
advocates for better access to medicines may do better influencing the
scope of patentability in statutory regimes than in negotiating a medical
research and innovation treaty.276 On the other hand, the shifting distribu-
tion of global political power also increases the opportunities for com-
promises that may not have existed in 2004 (IHR) or 2005 (FCTC) and
certainly did not exist in 1981 (International Code). For example, Brazil
and India, which operated largely outside the international trading system
in 1981, are now among its most important participants.277 Their thriving
275. See Health Action International, Long Awaited Steps Towards Affordable Access
and Needs-Driven Research and Development, 66th World Health Assembly, (June 17, 2013),
available at http://haieurope.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/HAI-Europe-statement-WHA-
66-FINAL.pdf.
276. See Liberman, supra note 258, at 333 (noting Western influence on Kenyan and
Ugandan definitions of “counterfeit” which included patented drugs); Combating Counterfeit
Medicines and Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products: Minefields in Global Health Governance, 40
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 326, 330 (2012); Gostin & Taylor, supra note 121, at 55 (noting deficien-
cies in using international law to address global health issues).
277. See LAURENCE HENRY, INDIA’S INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICY 3 (2008), availa-
ble at http://www.ifri.org/downloads/AV9.pdf (“Up until the 1980s, India was not interested in
exporting its goods and services abroad and not ready to open its economy to foreign invest-
ments”); Eliana Cardoso, A Brief History of Trade Policies in Brazil: From ISI, Export Pro-
motion and Import Liberalization to Multilateral and Regional Agreements (Mar. 2009)
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generics industries have encouraged both states to use international intel-
lectual property treaties to loosen the strong protections given patents and
trademarks in the medicines context.
Similarly, efforts like the putative Framework Convention on Alcohol
Control face long odds given that the world’s largest alcoholic beverage
firms have steep roots not only in North America and Europe but also in
Australia, Brazil, Mexico and South Africa. Paula O’Brien has pointed out
the inconsistency between Australia’s aggressive treatment of tobacco
trademarks and the protests it has launched against Thailand’s efforts to
use the same public health intervention for the alcohol disease burden it
bears.278
It is not only individual states and their relative influence that will
bear on the potential success of international public health law in the fu-
ture.279 Brazil, India and South Africa also build coalitions and alliances
through direct monetary and non-monetary aid.280 The growing web of
economic and political alliances between these and other developing states
will expand the possibilities for coalition building in support of certain in-
ternational instruments but against others.281
CONCLUSION
Confrontations between expanding intellectual property rights and in-
ternational public health law are now poised to increase rather than abate
as international agreements addressing both proliferate.282 If the popula-
tion health gains envisioned by the International Code, the IHR and the
FCTC, as well as the Framework Convention on Alcohol Control or the
Framework Convention on Global Health are to materialize, their respec-
tive advocates must more squarely address the obstacles international
property agreements pose for those gains and develop strategies to over-
come them or concede their political improbability. These strategies in-
clude negotiating concrete public health safe harbors in bilateral
investment and trade agreements, modifying dispute resolution mecha-
(First Draft, Tulane University), available at http://www.tulane.edu/~dnelson/PEBricsConf/
cardoso-trade.pdf (“Half a century of trade protectionist policies had resulted in Brazil hav-
ing less than a 1 percent share in global trade, despite its population representing almost 3
percent of the world’s population in 1990. The accumulation of problems from high levels of
debt and inefficient state-owned industries induced Brazil to rethink its strategy to a more
market-driven and trade oriented approach.”).
278. Paula O’Brien, Australia’s Double Standard on Thailand’s Alcohol Warning La-
bels, 32 DRUG & ALCOHOL REV. 5 (2013).
279. See generally Gerald D. Malpass Jr., Life After the GATT TRIPS Agreement-Has
the Competitive Position of U.S. Inventors Changed?, 19 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 207 (1996).
280. Peter K. Yu, Access to Medicines, BRICS Alliances, and Collective Action, 34 AM.
J.L. & MED. 345, 355 (2008).
281. Okie, supra note 222 (noting that Brazil, Argentina, China, Cuba, Nigeria, Russia,
Ukraine, and Thailand are working together to “improve each country’s capacity to manufac-
ture medicines, condoms, and laboratory reagents needed to fight AIDS”).
282. See Voon, supra note 256.
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nisms and conditioning compliance with national law and norms.283 Other
possibilities include ex post strategies that redistribute monopoly gains in-
tellectual property rights holders enjoy. For example, Article 19 of the
FCTC might authorize compensation for illness or injury caused by con-
sumption induced by a misleading trademark.284 The proposed Medical
Research and Innovation Treaty, for example, places at its core redistribu-
tive defects inherent in strong intellectual property regimes. Despite oppo-
sition from states with strong patent right holding constituencies, the
proposal is, slowly, moving forward. As or more important, the changing
distribution of economic, diplomatic and political power renders a broader
range of possibilities for coalition building and influence, especially where
Brazil, India and South Africa are key stakeholders.285
283. Rahim Moloo & Alex Khachaturian, The Compliance with the Law Requirement in
International Investment Law, 34 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1473, 1488 (2011).
284. This was in part the theory of the U.S. Government in its RICO claim against
tobacco firms for “light” and “low” claims.  While the trial court approved the government’s
theory of disgorgement, the federal appellate court ruled the government was not entitled to
disgorgement under the relevant statute.  U.S. v. Philip Morris, 396 F.3d 1190, 1191 (D.C. Cir.
2005).
285. See, e.g., CARLOS M. CORREA, TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENT (2007).
